WEBVTT 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:06.880 Good morning and welcome to this joint meeting of the Denton City Council and Public Utility 00:00:06.880 --> 00:00:07.880 Board. 00:00:07.880 --> 00:00:11.920 It is 11 a.m. on the 5th of April, 2021. 00:00:11.920 --> 00:00:16.600 I'm Mayor Pro Tem Jesse Davis, your regularly scheduled mayor, is unavoidably detained with 00:00:16.600 --> 00:00:18.760 a work obligation. 00:00:18.760 --> 00:00:22.320 But at this time, being a joint meeting, I'll first open the council meeting and then Vice 00:00:22.320 --> 00:00:25.160 Chair Bill Cheek will open the PUB meeting. 00:00:25.160 --> 00:00:29.960 So at this time, I call to order this meeting of the Denton City Council. 00:00:29.960 --> 00:00:36.640 Thank you, Mayor Pro Tem, I'm Bill Cheek, I'm Vice Chair of the Public Utility Board. 00:00:36.640 --> 00:00:42.180 If we didn't, it is 11 a.m. and I will call the Public Utility Board, joint meeting of 00:00:42.180 --> 00:00:43.960 the City Council Board. 00:00:43.960 --> 00:00:44.960 Thank you, Mr. Cheek. 00:00:44.960 --> 00:00:46.680 I will call our one and only item. 00:00:46.680 --> 00:00:51.080 This is a continuation of a meeting that we had back on the 23rd of March and we're not 00:00:51.080 --> 00:00:54.440 able to get to this last item. 00:00:54.440 --> 00:01:01.120 It is 1 a.i.d. 2 1 6 2 1, receive a report, hold a discussion, and give staff direction 00:01:01.120 --> 00:01:06.480 regarding processes, impacts, and results of service delivery during the February 2021 00:01:06.480 --> 00:01:12.160 inclement weather event by the Water and Wastewater Utilities Department. 00:01:12.160 --> 00:01:23.880 Good morning, Mayor Pro Tem, members of the council, Vice Chair, and members of the PUB. 00:01:23.880 --> 00:01:28.280 I'm Preet Sam Deshmukh, Deputy Director for Water and Wastewater Utilities, and I will 00:01:28.280 --> 00:01:35.000 be talking about our report on the remainder items from the utility side of things. 00:01:35.000 --> 00:01:41.560 Let me start by quickly sharing the screen and then we'll go from there. 00:01:41.560 --> 00:01:54.560 Let me know if you can see the screen. 00:01:54.560 --> 00:01:57.800 So it is a tag team effort. 00:01:57.800 --> 00:02:04.640 I will be going through the majority, almost 80% of the presentation, and will be joined 00:02:04.640 --> 00:02:11.720 towards the end, last couple slides by Terry Nolte, who has also been an interim director 00:02:11.720 --> 00:02:19.400 for the water/wastewater side of things and as we had transitioned into getting a new 00:02:19.400 --> 00:02:23.960 director, and I go through that in a little bit. 00:02:23.960 --> 00:02:25.840 So quick agenda. 00:02:25.840 --> 00:02:31.900 I will start on the water side of things, go through all the different areas, talk about 00:02:31.900 --> 00:02:41.320 our operation impact due to the storm, what changes we had to make or change in operation, 00:02:41.320 --> 00:02:46.200 and then talk about lessons learned and improvements. 00:02:46.200 --> 00:02:51.560 Kind of similar things on the wastewater side, and then go into specifically talking about 00:02:51.560 --> 00:02:58.000 the public communication piece of this whole storm event, and then overall lessons learned 00:02:58.000 --> 00:02:59.000 and improvement. 00:02:59.000 --> 00:03:03.040 So there are opportunities that we have to improve some of our operations and some of 00:03:03.040 --> 00:03:08.200 the stuff that we're working on, and ultimately kind of close it on a high note of what exactly 00:03:08.200 --> 00:03:12.200 worked during the storm event. 00:03:12.200 --> 00:03:15.980 So let's start with the water department operation. 00:03:15.980 --> 00:03:22.360 Our operation is primarily divided into four areas, starting with the treatment side of 00:03:22.360 --> 00:03:27.400 things, it's also called water production, which is where we take in water from lakes 00:03:27.400 --> 00:03:35.720 and treated and supply it to the residents and our customers here. 00:03:35.720 --> 00:03:41.760 So we typically, we have two water treatment plants, typical demand during the winter season 00:03:41.760 --> 00:03:44.640 is about 13 to 15 MGD. 00:03:44.640 --> 00:03:48.260 When I say MGD, it's a million gallons per day. 00:03:48.260 --> 00:03:53.880 So we're talking about a demand that's up to 15 million gallons. 00:03:53.880 --> 00:03:58.200 If you can see the breakdown, we have two treatment facilities. 00:03:58.200 --> 00:04:04.760 One is a Lake Louisville older facility that's in the heart of the city, and it treats about 00:04:04.760 --> 00:04:11.560 10 million gallons a day for taking care of the demand during the winter season. 00:04:11.560 --> 00:04:18.560 And Ray Roberts, which is closer to the Lake Ray Robert, right next to the dam, it treats 00:04:18.560 --> 00:04:23.280 about three to five million gallons a day during the winter time. 00:04:23.280 --> 00:04:27.880 The next area for our operation is the storage capacity. 00:04:27.880 --> 00:04:35.680 We currently have five elevated tanks that amount to a total of 11 million gallons, and 00:04:35.680 --> 00:04:41.640 then three ground storage tank, two of them are the larger ones are on site at the treatment 00:04:41.640 --> 00:04:45.200 facilities and they're about 14 million gallons. 00:04:45.200 --> 00:04:50.960 So total storage capacity that we have, it's 25 million gallons. 00:04:50.960 --> 00:04:53.640 Then we obviously have the pipes in the ground. 00:04:53.640 --> 00:04:55.200 It is our distribution system. 00:04:55.200 --> 00:04:58.560 We have larger pipes and smaller pipes and so on and so forth. 00:04:58.560 --> 00:05:06.720 Our main focus in that distribution system is to maintain a consistent pressure between 00:05:06.720 --> 00:05:10.320 50 and 80 pounds per square inch. 00:05:10.320 --> 00:05:16.440 So we have to maintain that pressure so that in any time in the system, the water is not 00:05:16.440 --> 00:05:22.920 stagnant, it's continuously moving and that pressure itself identifies that yes, the water 00:05:22.920 --> 00:05:26.200 is moving in the system and getting delivered to the places. 00:05:26.200 --> 00:05:33.480 And then last but not least, our customer facing or residential facing area of operation 00:05:33.480 --> 00:05:39.580 is the metering where we have all the residential meters and commercial and compound meters. 00:05:39.580 --> 00:05:47.280 We have approximately 39,000 residential meters and that is our final area of function within 00:05:47.280 --> 00:05:49.280 the water department. 00:05:49.280 --> 00:05:54.320 So I'm going to go a little bit into what exactly happened and why it happened. 00:05:54.320 --> 00:05:59.440 There were primarily two main reasons of what happened. 00:05:59.440 --> 00:06:05.440 We on the water production side of things, we were not able to maintain a constant treatment 00:06:05.440 --> 00:06:12.540 plant output because of a couple of things, one was the rolling outages and freezing temperatures. 00:06:12.540 --> 00:06:14.800 So that really impacted our operation. 00:06:14.800 --> 00:06:18.040 We're not able to maintain a constant plant output. 00:06:18.040 --> 00:06:24.240 And then the second thing happened was the peak demand was increased, almost doubled, 00:06:24.240 --> 00:06:33.160 went from a typical demand of 15 million gallons to a 13 million gallon a day, primarily caused 00:06:33.160 --> 00:06:39.640 due to some of the dripping faucets, and we had issued some conservation requests, made 00:06:39.640 --> 00:06:41.080 some public appeals. 00:06:41.080 --> 00:06:43.640 We'll go through that in a little bit. 00:06:43.640 --> 00:06:48.120 Those were the two primary reasons is not able to maintain a constant output and then 00:06:48.120 --> 00:06:51.840 a considerably higher demand for this time of the year. 00:06:51.840 --> 00:06:53.680 So why did it happen? 00:06:53.680 --> 00:06:59.220 In the treatment facilities, I'll start with Ray Robert treatment plant that was really 00:06:59.220 --> 00:07:03.320 impacted severely as compared to Lake Louisville. 00:07:03.320 --> 00:07:08.400 Ray Robert facility had five outages within a six hour time period. 00:07:08.400 --> 00:07:14.040 This was starting 6 a.m. early morning, Monday morning, and went through noon. 00:07:14.040 --> 00:07:21.600 And just to give an idea of what happens once an outage kicks in, it actually impacts all 00:07:21.600 --> 00:07:22.880 the aspects of the plan. 00:07:22.880 --> 00:07:27.660 So the operators have then have to go through the plan and look at every operation to make 00:07:27.660 --> 00:07:33.240 sure that everything is back to normal and then give the thumbs up for the whole operation 00:07:33.240 --> 00:07:34.240 to begin. 00:07:34.240 --> 00:07:38.080 So it takes a while for us to go back once one outage happened. 00:07:38.080 --> 00:07:43.040 Then imagine that in a series and sequence, you have five happening and just disrupted 00:07:43.040 --> 00:07:46.420 the production side of things. 00:07:46.420 --> 00:07:52.840 The other thing that did happen, we had an ozone generator failure right around the time 00:07:52.840 --> 00:07:55.480 during this Monday power outages. 00:07:55.480 --> 00:08:03.120 We also had some impacts due to the weather on the backup generators and then also some 00:08:03.120 --> 00:08:06.800 of the chlorine feed lines, which are fairly exposed. 00:08:06.800 --> 00:08:15.120 They're not buried down in the ground or they're not necessarily insulated, if you may. 00:08:15.120 --> 00:08:19.240 They froze up and that created some challenges for us. 00:08:19.240 --> 00:08:25.240 On the Lake Louisville treatment side of things, we had some issues with the intake bumps. 00:08:25.240 --> 00:08:32.720 So typically when we say we're treating water, there is an area near the lake where we have 00:08:32.720 --> 00:08:38.840 intake pumps, which actually pull water out of the lake and then send it to the treatment 00:08:38.840 --> 00:08:39.840 facility. 00:08:39.840 --> 00:08:41.380 So we were having issues. 00:08:41.380 --> 00:08:48.240 We have four intake pumps at this particular location and due to electric phase imbalance, 00:08:48.240 --> 00:08:49.880 only two were operational. 00:08:49.880 --> 00:08:56.120 So that considerably impacted our capacity to pull water out of the lake and get it to 00:08:56.120 --> 00:08:57.480 the plant for getting treated. 00:08:57.480 --> 00:09:01.740 So that's where that particular plant was impacted. 00:09:01.740 --> 00:09:04.560 As you can see, there were impacts to both these plants. 00:09:04.560 --> 00:09:11.760 Ultimately, our water production capacity was considerably constrained for the three 00:09:11.760 --> 00:09:16.760 days between Monday and Wednesday during that snowstorm week. 00:09:16.760 --> 00:09:21.080 Oops, sorry, I jumped. 00:09:21.080 --> 00:09:25.640 So what happened on the other types of areas that we are involved in? 00:09:25.640 --> 00:09:32.840 On the storage side, as I mentioned earlier, there was a significant increase in the demand. 00:09:32.840 --> 00:09:38.280 It went from a typical 15 million gallons a day to 30. 00:09:38.280 --> 00:09:42.600 And there was a constraint on the plant production side. 00:09:42.600 --> 00:09:48.920 So you can see both these really contributed to this storage issue. 00:09:48.920 --> 00:09:53.800 Because the demand was high, all the stored water in our storage facility started draining 00:09:53.800 --> 00:09:55.800 very quickly. 00:09:55.800 --> 00:09:59.040 And you can see on this side, you can see some of these grafts. 00:09:59.040 --> 00:10:02.480 You can see the drop in some of the water levels. 00:10:02.480 --> 00:10:08.040 So at some point, we're down in certain tanks, it was really minimal. 00:10:08.040 --> 00:10:15.240 But overall, system-wide, we were down to 10% to 15% of the storage capacity. 00:10:15.240 --> 00:10:22.360 So that was a really critical element that we had to monitor constantly. 00:10:22.360 --> 00:10:28.440 Because it did impact one of the key concerns here was public safety. 00:10:28.440 --> 00:10:33.720 So if we did not have enough water in our storage system and did not have enough water 00:10:33.720 --> 00:10:42.760 to pump out when it's needed, it created a public hazard or public health issue in case 00:10:42.760 --> 00:10:48.000 there was significant fire, in case there were significant other emergencies that required 00:10:48.000 --> 00:10:49.000 water. 00:10:49.000 --> 00:10:50.000 So that was critical. 00:10:50.000 --> 00:10:51.320 We were monitoring constantly. 00:10:51.320 --> 00:10:57.280 I do want to point out that that was a concern that staff was constantly looking at. 00:10:57.280 --> 00:11:04.080 On the distribution side, where the pipes in the ground, because of the freezing temperatures, 00:11:04.080 --> 00:11:06.400 we had more than normal average breaks. 00:11:06.400 --> 00:11:11.880 Typically, we have about three breaks a week during the month of February or throughout 00:11:11.880 --> 00:11:13.800 the winter itself. 00:11:13.800 --> 00:11:20.980 And in this particular week where the storm hit, we had 16 water main breaks. 00:11:20.980 --> 00:11:28.760 And then obviously on the meter side, we had a significant increase in requests from residents, 00:11:28.760 --> 00:11:36.200 not just to turn off water, but also report some of the leaks. 00:11:36.200 --> 00:11:41.680 And typically, we get about 90 tickets a week from residents, meaning they will call in 00:11:41.680 --> 00:11:47.320 and provide concerns that, hey, we need to turn off water, and there were issues with 00:11:47.320 --> 00:11:49.640 our connection. 00:11:49.640 --> 00:11:53.020 In that particular week, we had 740 tickets. 00:11:53.020 --> 00:11:58.280 So as you can see, there is a considerable impact on our operation on the water side 00:11:58.280 --> 00:12:03.840 of things, not just at the plants, but every single aspect of our operation was impacted 00:12:03.840 --> 00:12:04.840 during that week. 00:12:04.840 --> 00:12:07.960 Obviously, there were some other concerns that were happening. 00:12:07.960 --> 00:12:11.560 We had staff that had to continuously work around the clock. 00:12:11.560 --> 00:12:16.460 We have a specific number of plant operators that had to continually work. 00:12:16.460 --> 00:12:19.120 We had to schedule them appropriately. 00:12:19.120 --> 00:12:25.960 There were some staffing issues with our technical staff, our electrical staff that was attending 00:12:25.960 --> 00:12:31.440 some of these pumps and voltage and phase imbalances had to be reassigned. 00:12:31.440 --> 00:12:33.200 So we had some concern. 00:12:33.200 --> 00:12:35.760 We had some staffing issues there. 00:12:35.760 --> 00:12:38.520 Also, there was unreliable communication. 00:12:38.520 --> 00:12:45.640 Some of these towers for cell phone and some of the communication towers were impacted 00:12:45.640 --> 00:12:51.840 because of the power outages, and we were not getting reliable and constant communication. 00:12:51.840 --> 00:12:59.200 You can actually see some of these graphs don't have a full reading set because of unreliable 00:12:59.200 --> 00:13:03.280 communication in our network and in our SCADA system. 00:13:03.280 --> 00:13:09.080 And then last but not least, obviously, transporting things had become an issue due to the conditions 00:13:09.080 --> 00:13:10.080 on the road. 00:13:10.080 --> 00:13:12.720 The roads were sleek, ice everywhere. 00:13:12.720 --> 00:13:17.440 It was very difficult and I'll come to the point why that transportation piece was also 00:13:17.440 --> 00:13:24.360 impacting our operation and when we get to what exactly did we change and how did we 00:13:24.360 --> 00:13:27.720 deal with these different things. 00:13:27.720 --> 00:13:30.360 So mitigation, what did we do? 00:13:30.360 --> 00:13:35.720 As these problems were happening, the first thing we wanted to make sure that we actually 00:13:35.720 --> 00:13:40.920 addressed our main concern, which was the public safety concern. 00:13:40.920 --> 00:13:47.440 So we did issue a request for residents to start conserving water because we had that 00:13:47.440 --> 00:13:54.960 constraint capacity at the treatment facilities and then also considerable high demand for 00:13:54.960 --> 00:13:57.160 the three straight days. 00:13:57.160 --> 00:14:05.760 So the Ray Roberts plant on Monday, as these power outages were very frequently occurring, 00:14:05.760 --> 00:14:07.440 we switched to the generators. 00:14:07.440 --> 00:14:14.040 Initially, we had some issues with the generators, but we were able to overcome those issues 00:14:14.040 --> 00:14:19.300 and then restored continuous power supply to the treatment facility. 00:14:19.300 --> 00:14:27.160 We also had to bring in our in-house electrical folks to replace some of the damaged electronic 00:14:27.160 --> 00:14:36.680 components in the ozone generator, which was impacted due to the outages and fluctuation 00:14:36.680 --> 00:14:39.080 in electricity there. 00:14:39.080 --> 00:14:44.080 And then last, we had to change our chlorination process. 00:14:44.080 --> 00:14:52.280 So since the pipes that were providing chlorine to the water were frozen, we began using bleach 00:14:52.280 --> 00:14:53.520 to chlorinate. 00:14:53.520 --> 00:15:00.120 And you can see on this side of the screen actually a picture showing our folks bringing 00:15:00.120 --> 00:15:02.040 in bleach on trucks. 00:15:02.040 --> 00:15:07.040 There's a tote sitting on top of it, and that's where the transportation was required. 00:15:07.040 --> 00:15:12.640 This is where we required folks from another department to help us to move this bleach 00:15:12.640 --> 00:15:18.840 and bring it and feed it externally to chlorinate water. 00:15:18.840 --> 00:15:23.920 And I do want to point out one thing when you say bleach and chlorinate water, this 00:15:23.920 --> 00:15:26.120 is a standard process. 00:15:26.120 --> 00:15:31.240 It has been used on the other treatment facility, so this is not something new that we had to 00:15:31.240 --> 00:15:34.600 invent or it's not a tried and tested method. 00:15:34.600 --> 00:15:36.020 It is a tried and tested. 00:15:36.020 --> 00:15:37.940 We are already using this. 00:15:37.940 --> 00:15:45.200 So switching to that particular process really helped us continue operation at this particular 00:15:45.200 --> 00:15:46.960 treatment facility. 00:15:46.960 --> 00:15:54.200 On the Lake Louisville treatment facility, there were considerable issues with the electric 00:15:54.200 --> 00:15:56.760 supply phase imbalance. 00:15:56.760 --> 00:16:04.280 And we had to work not only water staff, but we had to work with DME staff tirelessly for 00:16:04.280 --> 00:16:11.280 three straight days to troubleshoot every single piece of not just the electronic side 00:16:11.280 --> 00:16:14.980 of things, but even the pump side of things and motor side of things. 00:16:14.980 --> 00:16:19.840 So we had to troubleshoot all of the things that were connected to the system. 00:16:19.840 --> 00:16:25.720 So ultimately, I think at the end of the third day, we were able to fix the problem. 00:16:25.720 --> 00:16:30.680 We were able to get the facilities back and running and the intake operation back. 00:16:30.680 --> 00:16:36.920 So that was our main focus in stabilizing the plant operation and increasing the production 00:16:36.920 --> 00:16:39.400 capacity to meet the demand. 00:16:39.400 --> 00:16:44.440 Similarly, we had to change operation on the other side of things. 00:16:44.440 --> 00:16:52.840 So storage, as I mentioned earlier, we constantly tracked every single tank and their levels. 00:16:52.840 --> 00:16:59.640 We almost had an hourly checklist and chart going every single time. 00:16:59.640 --> 00:17:00.640 What are the levels? 00:17:00.640 --> 00:17:01.640 Are we rising? 00:17:01.640 --> 00:17:02.640 Are we stable? 00:17:02.640 --> 00:17:03.640 Are we declining? 00:17:03.640 --> 00:17:06.280 So we had to really focus on keeping that. 00:17:06.280 --> 00:17:12.760 One of the things that we did, we did remove one storage tank out of the system that helped 00:17:12.760 --> 00:17:18.840 us add more, start filling up the other tanks fairly quickly. 00:17:18.840 --> 00:17:23.640 As the Rosalong tank is a little bit at a higher elevation, it takes a lot longer to 00:17:23.640 --> 00:17:26.440 get that tank and pressure build up to fill it. 00:17:26.440 --> 00:17:27.480 So we took it offline. 00:17:27.480 --> 00:17:32.800 We started filling all the other tanks and get them to a level where we're comfortable. 00:17:32.800 --> 00:17:38.640 And then slowly we introduced the Rosalong tank back into the whole operation. 00:17:38.640 --> 00:17:42.720 On the distribution side, as I mentioned, we had several leaks. 00:17:42.720 --> 00:17:48.700 And in order to address these high number of leaks, we deployed wastewater crews. 00:17:48.700 --> 00:17:52.520 There was minimal impact to our wastewater system. 00:17:52.520 --> 00:17:57.760 So the collections, since these wastewater pipes are typically buried deep in the ground, 00:17:57.760 --> 00:18:02.480 the water flowing through them is actually coming from homes, which are warmer water. 00:18:02.480 --> 00:18:05.220 So we didn't have that much impact on the wastewater side. 00:18:05.220 --> 00:18:11.760 So what we did, we were able to reassign the wastewater crews to go and help dig up the 00:18:11.760 --> 00:18:17.000 trenches, help set up the equipment and help fix a large number of breaks. 00:18:17.000 --> 00:18:23.280 So that was a really reassignment that staff really helped us address some of these breaks 00:18:23.280 --> 00:18:26.680 very quickly and get things under control. 00:18:26.680 --> 00:18:34.680 Similarly, on the metering side, we received a significant number of higher phone calls. 00:18:34.680 --> 00:18:41.720 So customer service staff was able to jump in, set up, you know, makeshift areas to start 00:18:41.720 --> 00:18:47.640 addressing and answer, I'm sorry, something's happening, oh, there we go, makeshift and 00:18:47.640 --> 00:18:50.280 answer some of the questions. 00:18:50.280 --> 00:18:56.000 And then also we had wastewater staff also jump in again and help the metering staff 00:18:56.000 --> 00:19:02.160 go out and start turning the meters off, start helping with water leaks at the residential 00:19:02.160 --> 00:19:03.160 service line. 00:19:03.160 --> 00:19:07.840 So it was really helpful to reassign some of the staff, a lot of city staff jumped in 00:19:07.840 --> 00:19:12.920 and we'll get to that, what really worked portion and Terry gets to talk about that 00:19:12.920 --> 00:19:17.320 a little bit later in the presentation. 00:19:17.320 --> 00:19:20.240 Wastewater departments, that was all about water. 00:19:20.240 --> 00:19:22.680 Now we're moving to wastewater. 00:19:22.680 --> 00:19:30.360 I want to start down here where majority of the issues were handled without a large incident. 00:19:30.360 --> 00:19:36.120 There was not a whole lot of impact, although there were some minor issues. 00:19:36.120 --> 00:19:44.040 As you can see, the wastewater treatment facility saw a increase in flow, which is about 40, 00:19:44.040 --> 00:19:49.840 50% higher flow coming into the treatment facility. 00:19:49.840 --> 00:19:56.160 There were some impacts from the weather, freezing of sludge lines and freezing of backwash 00:19:56.160 --> 00:19:59.700 system at the ropes and ranch reclamation plant. 00:19:59.700 --> 00:20:05.940 And then also freezing of some biodiesel fuel, it thickened and it impacted the generators 00:20:05.940 --> 00:20:09.200 that we used in the lift station during the rolling outages. 00:20:09.200 --> 00:20:14.720 So yes, there was some impact weather-wise as some of these lines started freezing up, 00:20:14.720 --> 00:20:21.000 we were able to quickly get staff in and unfreeze them and get the operation back to normal. 00:20:21.000 --> 00:20:26.040 And then the other thing, we did see a lot of collaboration, wastewater staff helping 00:20:26.040 --> 00:20:31.040 water production address some of these staff issues, staffing issues, and also helping 00:20:31.040 --> 00:20:38.720 them provide electrical, technical expertise in addressing some of their problems. 00:20:38.720 --> 00:20:45.040 So all in all, wastewater department was less impacted, if you may, compared to the other 00:20:45.040 --> 00:20:47.360 operation that we have. 00:20:47.360 --> 00:20:51.560 And then quickly go over the public, I know there's a lot of information on this slide, 00:20:51.560 --> 00:20:55.680 I don't want you to just focus on this particular table. 00:20:55.680 --> 00:20:59.800 These are the, this is just a print of actual notifications that were sent out. 00:20:59.800 --> 00:21:06.680 A quick timeline on what information and when it was sent out, I want to point out this 00:21:06.680 --> 00:21:14.980 was 2/16, I think it was a Tuesday that we started noticing a considerable drop in storage 00:21:14.980 --> 00:21:20.560 tank levels and immediately issued a water conservation notice. 00:21:20.560 --> 00:21:27.520 And then we tracked the following day on Wednesday, we saw that the tank levels were improving 00:21:27.520 --> 00:21:33.240 but still wanted to maintain that hey, we need to conserve water to get to a comfortable 00:21:33.240 --> 00:21:37.900 position, so we continue to issue a conservation notice. 00:21:37.900 --> 00:21:42.360 And then on Wednesday, unfortunately, our system wide pressure, there were quite a few 00:21:42.360 --> 00:21:50.760 locations that the pressure within the pipe dropped below 20 pounds per square inch, consistent 00:21:50.760 --> 00:21:56.840 with the TCEQ guidelines, we have to report it, we have to issue a boil notice and report 00:21:56.840 --> 00:22:06.520 it to TCEQ, so staff had to follow that direction from the state agency from TCEQ, making sure 00:22:06.520 --> 00:22:13.240 that everyone was notified that there was a pressure drop and finally boil water notice 00:22:13.240 --> 00:22:16.200 was issued. 00:22:16.200 --> 00:22:21.480 In the next couple days, we really focused on stabilizing the levels in the storage tank 00:22:21.480 --> 00:22:27.680 for the water and then also worked on updating the boil water notice. 00:22:27.680 --> 00:22:35.160 And then finally, Saturday morning, we were able to lift the boil water notice and cancel 00:22:35.160 --> 00:22:41.640 that a little bit of steps in between is not only we have to stabilize, but we have to 00:22:41.640 --> 00:22:47.920 conduct sampling and analysis, which typically takes about 12 to 18 hours. 00:22:47.920 --> 00:22:55.280 So we started that, we set up the sampling collection on Friday, so the notice was issued 00:22:55.280 --> 00:22:59.600 on Wednesday, we set up the collection on Friday where we felt, yes, we're at a point 00:22:59.600 --> 00:23:02.240 where the system was back. 00:23:02.240 --> 00:23:08.720 And we picked samples up by noon, we had all of them in the lab and started testing once 00:23:08.720 --> 00:23:11.200 the test was complete. 00:23:11.200 --> 00:23:16.640 On Friday, Saturday morning is when we got the results and immediately issued the cancellation. 00:23:16.640 --> 00:23:22.920 So that was a little bit of timeline to understand what was going on on our side versus the outward 00:23:22.920 --> 00:23:27.040 facing piece with the public and the notifications. 00:23:27.040 --> 00:23:32.040 And then I want to turn to Terry for the last couple of slides. 00:23:32.040 --> 00:23:37.240 He is online and he will be talking about the action items or the opportunities for 00:23:37.240 --> 00:23:41.280 improvement and then the final slide, which is what worked. 00:23:41.280 --> 00:23:42.280 Terry? 00:23:42.280 --> 00:23:47.280 Yes, good morning, Council, POB members. 00:23:47.280 --> 00:23:53.760 I'm going to go over these improvement opportunities and just briefly describe kind of the actions 00:23:53.760 --> 00:23:55.820 that we're going to be taking. 00:23:55.820 --> 00:24:01.320 And I'll just point out that during the storm, I was in a role acting as interim director 00:24:01.320 --> 00:24:04.880 of water and wastewater. 00:24:04.880 --> 00:24:09.540 And I want to thank the water and wastewater team for the job that they did, although we 00:24:09.540 --> 00:24:15.760 never like to issue full water notices, we are required to do so under these conditions 00:24:15.760 --> 00:24:22.120 and they worked very, very hard to get the system back into operating state as quickly 00:24:22.120 --> 00:24:23.980 as possible. 00:24:23.980 --> 00:24:30.040 So I'm going to give you all these improvement opportunities and then our new director of 00:24:30.040 --> 00:24:34.800 water and wastewater, Stephen Gay, who's online here with me, is going to get the opportunity 00:24:34.800 --> 00:24:40.760 to bring these back in front of you to the extent that they require either POB or council 00:24:40.760 --> 00:24:42.400 approval. 00:24:42.400 --> 00:24:46.000 So the first area we'll talk about is public communication. 00:24:46.000 --> 00:24:53.600 I think there was a number of comments that we received that our messages were confusing. 00:24:53.600 --> 00:25:02.680 At the same time that we're talking about people running their faucets to drip to keep 00:25:02.680 --> 00:25:07.600 their lines from freezing up, we're also asking for water conservation measures. 00:25:07.600 --> 00:25:15.160 And I think as Preetam has described, that was a necessary evil because our tank levels 00:25:15.160 --> 00:25:22.700 were going down so quickly, we had to ask for those conservation measures. 00:25:22.700 --> 00:25:30.680 So we're working on messaging and getting some predetermined messages that are approved 00:25:30.680 --> 00:25:38.240 for these situations so that we can avoid the level of confusion. 00:25:38.240 --> 00:25:43.080 We've reviewed our SOPs, our standard operating procedures and our emergency plans to make 00:25:43.080 --> 00:25:51.360 sure that we're fully compliant with TCEQ requirements and that we have the right contacts 00:25:51.360 --> 00:25:56.660 in place both within the city and within the media outlets. 00:25:56.660 --> 00:26:04.080 And then social media response, you know, most of our communication these days is through 00:26:04.080 --> 00:26:05.600 social media. 00:26:05.600 --> 00:26:10.600 That's the most rapid way that we can get messaging out to our customers. 00:26:10.600 --> 00:26:17.960 And so we are looking at social media policy issues. 00:26:17.960 --> 00:26:24.320 One of the issues is we don't normally respond to social media posts. 00:26:24.320 --> 00:26:29.320 And we were seeing some posts that potentially exacerbated the problem. 00:26:29.320 --> 00:26:35.200 We had a number of posts where citizens were saying that, hey, there's a main break at 00:26:35.200 --> 00:26:42.080 this location, fill your bathtub with water so that you don't run out of water. 00:26:42.080 --> 00:26:46.320 And we were not able to respond to those postings. 00:26:46.320 --> 00:26:53.800 And we need to look at that to make sure in those situations we have the proper response. 00:26:53.800 --> 00:26:56.640 We've heard a lot of talk about weatherization. 00:26:56.640 --> 00:27:02.400 And clearly we've got to invest some money in weatherization. 00:27:02.400 --> 00:27:09.280 The Ray Roberts chlorine system we will include as part of a project that we have going on, 00:27:09.280 --> 00:27:14.560 the Ray Roberts regulatory upgrade, which is a large capital project, $30 million plus 00:27:14.560 --> 00:27:16.740 project that we have going on. 00:27:16.740 --> 00:27:19.040 We're doing the design work now. 00:27:19.040 --> 00:27:25.560 We will integrate those weatherization issues into that design. 00:27:25.560 --> 00:27:31.460 Tank levels, the chart that Preetam showed just showed that we lost tank signals. 00:27:31.460 --> 00:27:33.720 We couldn't tell how much water was in our tanks. 00:27:33.720 --> 00:27:35.340 And that's never a good situation. 00:27:35.340 --> 00:27:40.120 So we're going to have to look at how to upgrade those to make sure we always have constant 00:27:40.120 --> 00:27:43.820 surveillance of our water levels. 00:27:43.820 --> 00:27:48.360 We did have the wastewater sludge line freeze up at Pecan Creek. 00:27:48.360 --> 00:27:54.200 We're also doing a solid handling project, which we're doing the design work on that 00:27:54.200 --> 00:27:59.760 now and we'll integrate into that design some weatherization. 00:27:59.760 --> 00:28:08.160 The Robeson Ranch backwash issue, we are decommissioning the Robeson Ranch wastewater treatment plant 00:28:08.160 --> 00:28:13.680 in 2022 and be diverting that wastewater to Pecan Creek. 00:28:13.680 --> 00:28:17.400 And so that one's kind of a self-healing. 00:28:17.400 --> 00:28:20.940 We're going to be taking care of that without any additional investments. 00:28:20.940 --> 00:28:24.760 And then flushing truck bay. 00:28:24.760 --> 00:28:29.720 When we see this severe weather coming in, we're going to have to take some additional 00:28:29.720 --> 00:28:35.160 measures to get our critical equipment into heated areas so that we can ensure that they're 00:28:35.160 --> 00:28:37.880 going to be able to start up. 00:28:37.880 --> 00:28:45.040 On the power supply side, Ray Roberts, the backup generators were not operating at the 00:28:45.040 --> 00:28:48.480 level or reliability that we would like them to. 00:28:48.480 --> 00:28:49.600 We're going to have to look at that. 00:28:49.600 --> 00:28:55.140 And again, that'll be part of that regulatory upgrade scope of work. 00:28:55.140 --> 00:29:00.560 We have been in contact with the electric provider, which is CoServe. 00:29:00.560 --> 00:29:07.880 And as you're aware, there's a statewide effort going on to identify all the critical facilities. 00:29:07.880 --> 00:29:13.380 And we've added this facility to the list and hopefully that will resolve our issue. 00:29:13.380 --> 00:29:22.320 We still need backup generation there in the event that we would lose that power feed. 00:29:22.320 --> 00:29:27.240 The intake pumps, we've resolved that issue as a switch problem on the DME circuit. 00:29:27.240 --> 00:29:33.320 And we feel comfortably that we've resolved that with no additional efforts. 00:29:33.320 --> 00:29:41.360 The boil water advisory, I just want to make sure everybody's clear on this. 00:29:41.360 --> 00:29:47.520 We were forced to make the boil water advisory because our pressure dropped below 20 PSI. 00:29:47.520 --> 00:29:53.860 At no time did we have concerns that contaminated water had been pulled into our water system. 00:29:53.860 --> 00:29:59.720 This was a regulatory requirement due to that high demand and our inability to produce water 00:29:59.720 --> 00:30:03.020 in sufficient quantities to meet that demand. 00:30:03.020 --> 00:30:11.480 And so that conflicting information, again, what happened was once we lifted the boil 00:30:11.480 --> 00:30:19.240 water advisory, we saw posts on social media telling residents to run their water for 10 00:30:19.240 --> 00:30:26.160 minutes before they could consume it and to flush out their ice machines to make sure 00:30:26.160 --> 00:30:34.360 that the ice that potentially was made with contaminated water was fully flushed out of 00:30:34.360 --> 00:30:36.160 the system. 00:30:36.160 --> 00:30:43.720 And in a normal water main break situation where we lose pressure and we have an open 00:30:43.720 --> 00:30:50.880 pipe that could potentially pull in water from an excavation, contaminated water, that 00:30:50.880 --> 00:30:52.080 would be an issue. 00:30:52.080 --> 00:30:58.560 But in this case, since we never had an opening to contaminated water, that was not a concern 00:30:58.560 --> 00:30:59.560 that we had. 00:30:59.560 --> 00:31:01.560 And we need to do a better job of communicating that. 00:31:01.560 --> 00:31:08.840 So we'll be working on communication protocols to ensure that that's clear. 00:31:08.840 --> 00:31:15.920 And then one thing that we didn't anticipate, which was having no power to boil water with. 00:31:15.920 --> 00:31:21.680 So when you don't have any power to be able to run your electric stove to boil water with, 00:31:21.680 --> 00:31:25.720 that's a situation that we had not contemplated. 00:31:25.720 --> 00:31:32.360 And so we're considering what our inventory level should be for bottled water and in-house 00:31:32.360 --> 00:31:35.240 capabilities for production. 00:31:35.240 --> 00:31:43.280 Some other issues that came up because the inability of transportation systems became 00:31:43.280 --> 00:31:53.520 precipitously low on certain chemical inventories and we have revised our processes, our standard 00:31:53.520 --> 00:31:58.640 operating procedures now to look at those chemical inventory levels at our production 00:31:58.640 --> 00:32:07.940 facilities in anticipation of the winter months coming on a potential repeat. 00:32:07.940 --> 00:32:13.240 One of your new director of water, wastewater strengths is emergency planning and he'll 00:32:13.240 --> 00:32:19.880 be looking at all of our emergency planning and processes and incident command integration 00:32:19.880 --> 00:32:25.440 to make sure that they are best in class. 00:32:25.440 --> 00:32:31.760 Preetam mentioned the staffing issue that we ran into, which was our instrument and 00:32:31.760 --> 00:32:35.220 controls and electricians personnel. 00:32:35.220 --> 00:32:40.200 We found out through this process that we didn't have enough. 00:32:40.200 --> 00:32:41.980 We have limited staff in that area. 00:32:41.980 --> 00:32:51.640 We actually had to borrow staff from DME both from the line crews and from the deck to help 00:32:51.640 --> 00:32:57.880 troubleshoot some issues and to provide a level of staffing necessary to meet the demands. 00:32:57.880 --> 00:33:01.700 So that's something that as we go through the budget for next year, we'll be looking 00:33:01.700 --> 00:33:09.520 at getting rid of that risk if we can. 00:33:09.520 --> 00:33:20.440 The number of pipe breaks in homes and the need for us to come out and turn off the meter, 00:33:20.440 --> 00:33:25.920 turn off the water to the home at the street was hampered by the fact that we were sending 00:33:25.920 --> 00:33:35.920 crews out and there was still ice and materials that were overtop of the meter boxes and where 00:33:35.920 --> 00:33:42.280 the valves were, it took a long time to locate a number of these shutoffs. 00:33:42.280 --> 00:33:47.820 And so we'll be looking at geolocating each of those so that someone can go out with an 00:33:47.820 --> 00:33:55.960 instrument and know precisely where that valve should be located on these homes and businesses. 00:33:55.960 --> 00:34:04.760 And then finally, the diesel fuel, this was an issue across all of our utilities. 00:34:04.760 --> 00:34:10.720 When the temperature got down and below zero, that diesel fuel gelled and we couldn't get 00:34:10.720 --> 00:34:13.480 generators or trucks started. 00:34:13.480 --> 00:34:19.880 And we're working with Fleet to see if we can't provide some additives that will abate 00:34:19.880 --> 00:34:21.320 that problem in the future. 00:34:21.320 --> 00:34:24.520 Go to the next slide if you would, pre-Tim. 00:34:24.520 --> 00:34:26.640 So what did work? 00:34:26.640 --> 00:34:31.360 Our staff did a stellar job. 00:34:31.360 --> 00:34:33.560 Everybody pulled together. 00:34:33.560 --> 00:34:41.800 Like I said, we used people from DME, we used people from Fleet to transport chemicals from 00:34:41.800 --> 00:34:44.360 Louisville to Ray Roberts. 00:34:44.360 --> 00:34:48.120 It was just an amazing show of teamwork. 00:34:48.120 --> 00:34:57.440 Our lab provides laboratory results or laboratory analysis with just unbelievable quick turnaround 00:34:57.440 --> 00:34:58.440 times. 00:34:58.440 --> 00:35:02.260 Having that capability in-house saved us countless hours. 00:35:02.260 --> 00:35:08.400 And by the way, they do that service for other municipalities as well. 00:35:08.400 --> 00:35:11.680 And they don't get the praise that they deserve. 00:35:11.680 --> 00:35:17.920 They do a super job at the lab and they're a very valuable asset to the city. 00:35:17.920 --> 00:35:18.920 Strong leadership. 00:35:18.920 --> 00:35:24.560 I mean, the city manager's office was, we were on the phone four times a day, every 00:35:24.560 --> 00:35:33.480 day for the entire duration of the storm from really from Saturday the 13th all the way 00:35:33.480 --> 00:35:38.800 through Saturday the 20th until the incidents were over. 00:35:38.800 --> 00:35:44.440 And the city manager's office provided us with the support we needed. 00:35:44.440 --> 00:35:51.040 We even had folks from HR that were bringing food out to our employees that had been working 00:35:51.040 --> 00:35:54.120 24 hours or more. 00:35:54.120 --> 00:35:57.320 Just really appreciated all that support. 00:35:57.320 --> 00:36:03.760 And the constant clear lines of communication with city staff were critical, as well as 00:36:03.760 --> 00:36:08.400 trying to do the best we possibly could with residents to keep them up to speed on what 00:36:08.400 --> 00:36:16.760 was happening so that they understood when water was expected to come back. 00:36:16.760 --> 00:36:18.640 And we actually beat our estimate. 00:36:18.640 --> 00:36:24.920 We anticipated that it would be early Sunday morning for releasing the boil water advisor. 00:36:24.920 --> 00:36:29.320 We were able to actually get it released mid-morning on Saturday. 00:36:29.320 --> 00:36:34.120 So with that, Preetam, if you'll take it down, we can answer any questions. 00:36:34.120 --> 00:36:40.600 Give me a second. 00:36:40.600 --> 00:36:47.520 There we go. 00:36:47.520 --> 00:36:50.120 Okay, questions? 00:36:50.120 --> 00:36:52.160 Mr. Jumper, I think I saw you first. 00:36:52.160 --> 00:36:54.120 Yeah, thanks, guys. 00:36:54.120 --> 00:36:56.840 I have two questions, if I may. 00:36:56.840 --> 00:37:03.800 You mentioned storage capacity got down around 10 to 15%, I believe. 00:37:03.800 --> 00:37:07.500 So I was curious, I didn't catch this if you said it. 00:37:07.500 --> 00:37:09.400 What is an acceptable minimum? 00:37:09.400 --> 00:37:10.400 What's dangerous? 00:37:10.400 --> 00:37:13.480 Like, what does that level mean for us? 00:37:13.480 --> 00:37:21.040 Yeah, I would say anything lower than 20% is a danger zone that we need to be very concerned 00:37:21.040 --> 00:37:22.040 about. 00:37:22.040 --> 00:37:24.480 And the issue there is really a public safety issue. 00:37:24.480 --> 00:37:30.600 To the extent that we had a major fire in the city, we'd have a hard time recovering 00:37:30.600 --> 00:37:32.520 our tank levels. 00:37:32.520 --> 00:37:34.560 Okay. 00:37:34.560 --> 00:37:44.280 And then secondly, I have to ask, has anybody looked into the implications of the do not 00:37:44.280 --> 00:37:46.320 drip notice? 00:37:46.320 --> 00:37:51.480 Telling people not to drip in their lines, did that in fact cause more line breaks? 00:37:51.480 --> 00:37:53.680 Has anybody looked at anything like that? 00:37:53.680 --> 00:37:56.240 Do we know anything? 00:37:56.240 --> 00:37:58.760 We've not done any investigations on that. 00:37:58.760 --> 00:38:08.560 I think line breaks are really more a result of shifting ground from freezing and thawing 00:38:08.560 --> 00:38:13.800 and the temperature of the water in the lines. 00:38:13.800 --> 00:38:19.900 We're pulling water out of the lake and as the lake gets colder, that temperature differentiation 00:38:19.900 --> 00:38:24.680 between the water and the pipe, the steel and the surrounding ground causes an expansion 00:38:24.680 --> 00:38:31.000 issue and that's really what leads to most of the breaks that we see during really cold 00:38:31.000 --> 00:38:32.000 weather periods. 00:38:32.000 --> 00:38:38.920 Are you talking in the mains in the main system or in individual houses? 00:38:38.920 --> 00:38:44.400 I was speaking of water mains and distribution lines, yeah. 00:38:44.400 --> 00:38:50.720 As far as homes go, you know, the theory is if you keep water running through your pipes, 00:38:50.720 --> 00:38:56.160 then the ice will not have time to build up and expand and crack your pipe. 00:38:56.160 --> 00:39:01.920 So if you keep water running through there, you should not seem to have that problem. 00:39:01.920 --> 00:39:06.880 You know, our issue here was that while we wanted to help homeowners to protect their 00:39:06.880 --> 00:39:15.920 personal property, we had to worry about public safety and that's why we were asking for conservation 00:39:15.920 --> 00:39:22.240 notices at the same time they were hearing that you need to keep your lines dripping 00:39:22.240 --> 00:39:25.680 in order to keep them from freezing up. 00:39:25.680 --> 00:39:29.080 Mr. Sof? 00:39:29.080 --> 00:39:32.680 Yes, thank you. 00:39:32.680 --> 00:39:41.200 I had some questions about the 16 water main breaks. 00:39:41.200 --> 00:39:48.240 Were these caused by freezing water or by ground shifts or both? 00:39:48.240 --> 00:39:50.080 I think it was all of the above. 00:39:50.080 --> 00:39:56.320 There were several things that played into that, not only the temperature and the differential, 00:39:56.320 --> 00:40:02.560 but also the pipe material, the age of the pipes and where they were located. 00:40:02.560 --> 00:40:05.040 I think it was all of the above. 00:40:05.040 --> 00:40:10.080 Okay, you sort of answered my other questions because I was curious if there was a consensus 00:40:10.080 --> 00:40:14.960 of older pipes, newer pipes, iron PVC? 00:40:14.960 --> 00:40:15.960 Correct. 00:40:15.960 --> 00:40:16.960 Yeah. 00:40:16.960 --> 00:40:19.240 It included all pipe material. 00:40:19.240 --> 00:40:20.680 There are some of the larger pipes. 00:40:20.680 --> 00:40:23.000 There were ductile iron. 00:40:23.000 --> 00:40:24.000 They had breaks as well. 00:40:24.000 --> 00:40:29.960 It was not just the particular type of material that was impacted. 00:40:29.960 --> 00:40:31.960 Okay. 00:40:31.960 --> 00:40:35.120 Were these mains above ground or below ground? 00:40:35.120 --> 00:40:36.120 Below ground. 00:40:36.120 --> 00:40:39.160 The majority of these mains have to be dug out. 00:40:39.160 --> 00:40:44.120 Do you know how many customers were affected by those 16 breaks? 00:40:44.120 --> 00:40:49.120 I don't have that direct number on top of my head, but there were several main breaks 00:40:49.120 --> 00:40:53.680 that we were able to isolate without impacting the customers. 00:40:53.680 --> 00:40:59.360 We did put some of these pieces of pipe in isolation and diverted around them because 00:40:59.360 --> 00:41:03.080 we have a loop system in the majority of the city. 00:41:03.080 --> 00:41:09.080 Going back to something that Terry said about water flow reducing ice formation, does that 00:41:09.080 --> 00:41:13.280 have any bearing on water mains too? 00:41:13.280 --> 00:41:17.120 I would assume that there's water flowing through those all the time. 00:41:17.120 --> 00:41:18.120 Correct. 00:41:18.120 --> 00:41:23.960 Then the other piece to that is how deep they're buried because there is a certain level that 00:41:23.960 --> 00:41:29.720 the freezing reaches to and depending on the timeline that how long the freezing is actually 00:41:29.720 --> 00:41:36.000 happening, if the pipe is buried fairly deep, it doesn't hit those pipes as far as the temperature 00:41:36.000 --> 00:41:37.000 is concerned. 00:41:37.000 --> 00:41:46.920 I guess the big question is, and I didn't see it mentioned in the action items and improvement 00:41:46.920 --> 00:41:52.920 opportunities, is how do you weatherize water mains? 00:41:52.920 --> 00:41:56.280 Do you dig them up and make them deeper or what? 00:41:56.280 --> 00:41:59.480 It seems like a real conundrum. 00:41:59.480 --> 00:42:04.360 It is a challenge and Terry can jump in a little bit, but it is a challenge. 00:42:04.360 --> 00:42:10.080 Obviously, there are freezing lines defined in several regions throughout the US where 00:42:10.080 --> 00:42:11.840 there are cold temperatures. 00:42:11.840 --> 00:42:17.480 If you go to a place like Chicago, the freezing lines are under three. 00:42:17.480 --> 00:42:21.040 Everything has to be three to four feet below ground because that's where the freezing lines 00:42:21.040 --> 00:42:22.240 hit. 00:42:22.240 --> 00:42:27.680 For areas where we are at, it's about six inches currently, but when you hit something 00:42:27.680 --> 00:42:32.880 like this, which is unexpected and stays for more than three to four days, those lines 00:42:32.880 --> 00:42:35.280 typically dip down further in. 00:42:35.280 --> 00:42:42.440 As a utility, does it make sense to lower all the lines for one event? 00:42:42.440 --> 00:42:50.320 That's a difficult question to answer and it doesn't financially make sense at this 00:42:50.320 --> 00:42:53.840 point, but Terry can add to that. 00:42:53.840 --> 00:42:54.840 Thank you very much. 00:42:54.840 --> 00:43:04.480 I don't have anything to add except that really it's just the nature of the beast. 00:43:04.480 --> 00:43:11.160 We have development codes that require lines to be placed at a certain depth, below a certain 00:43:11.160 --> 00:43:16.640 depth, and that's in order to provide that level of freeze protection as well. 00:43:16.640 --> 00:43:23.280 Anecdotally, for a groundwater system where you're pumping water out of the ground at 00:43:23.280 --> 00:43:29.960 a constant temperature year round, you don't typically have a lot of main breaks. 00:43:29.960 --> 00:43:35.600 Most of the main breaks are due to this big swing in temperature of the water inside the 00:43:35.600 --> 00:43:36.600 pipe. 00:43:36.600 --> 00:43:42.880 If you think about it, you got very cold water in a pipe surrounded by soil that's a relatively 00:43:42.880 --> 00:43:49.200 stable temperature and that contraction because of that cold water in the pipe causes stresses 00:43:49.200 --> 00:43:53.920 on the piping system that you don't normally see and that's what causes a lot of the main 00:43:53.920 --> 00:43:54.920 breaks. 00:43:54.920 --> 00:43:57.400 If I may, one more question. 00:43:57.400 --> 00:43:59.400 Go ahead. 00:43:59.400 --> 00:44:06.440 You have figures on how many or if there were any water main breaks in 2011 when that weather 00:44:06.440 --> 00:44:08.080 event occurred. 00:44:08.080 --> 00:44:11.920 Yes, we can pull that information if we have that available. 00:44:11.920 --> 00:44:12.920 Absolutely. 00:44:12.920 --> 00:44:15.680 I'd really like to see that. 00:44:15.680 --> 00:44:16.680 Thank you very much. 00:44:16.680 --> 00:44:20.280 Thank you, Mr. Sof, Mr. Rybak. 00:44:20.280 --> 00:44:22.440 Yes, thank you. 00:44:22.440 --> 00:44:23.440 I was curious. 00:44:23.440 --> 00:44:28.200 I think it was Terry earlier mentioned PCQ. 00:44:28.200 --> 00:44:31.680 I'm just don't know what that is so I'd like to ask. 00:44:31.680 --> 00:44:41.880 Yes, T-C-T is in Terry, T-C-E-Q, that's the Texas Environmental, Texas, help me out guys. 00:44:41.880 --> 00:44:44.880 Texas Commission on Environmental Quality. 00:44:44.880 --> 00:44:45.880 Oh, T-C-E-Q. 00:44:45.880 --> 00:44:46.880 Okay. 00:44:46.880 --> 00:44:53.880 So, it's the regulatory agency that issues the permits for our water treatment system 00:44:53.880 --> 00:44:58.320 and regulates drinking water throughout the state. 00:44:58.320 --> 00:44:59.560 Okay, thank you. 00:44:59.560 --> 00:45:08.280 The other thing you guys had mentioned, weatherizing fuel lines for the generators, does that weatherization 00:45:08.280 --> 00:45:14.680 mean just insulation or are you looking at heat trace on the lines, tanks above ground, 00:45:14.680 --> 00:45:18.640 belly tanks on the generators, can you tell us a little more about that? 00:45:18.640 --> 00:45:20.920 Go ahead, Terry. 00:45:20.920 --> 00:45:28.400 Yeah, so we'll have to study that and it'll be specific to each of the sites. 00:45:28.400 --> 00:45:34.960 You know, theoretically if we can list all of our water production facilities, our booster 00:45:34.960 --> 00:45:40.400 pump stations and tanks as critical facilities and they're on circuits that we don't lose 00:45:40.400 --> 00:45:45.320 electric on, should this happen again, the level of weatherization probably will be less 00:45:45.320 --> 00:45:50.920 than if they have to be operated as a remote standalone operation, so each facility we 00:45:50.920 --> 00:45:52.440 looked at individually. 00:45:52.440 --> 00:45:58.320 Yeah, so I was a little surprised to find that your water facilities were not on the 00:45:58.320 --> 00:46:03.800 critical facility list, I must have been kind of a surprise to you guys too. 00:46:03.800 --> 00:46:07.840 Unfortunately it was, yes. 00:46:07.840 --> 00:46:10.080 Thank you. 00:46:10.080 --> 00:46:11.080 Thank you Mr. Ibeck. 00:46:11.080 --> 00:46:12.080 Council member Armentor. 00:46:12.080 --> 00:46:16.720 Yes, I have three questions. 00:46:16.720 --> 00:46:20.440 The first one is about communication with the fire department. 00:46:20.440 --> 00:46:29.920 I was curious, you know, what, if any communication there was either way between the, from the 00:46:29.920 --> 00:46:39.000 water department to the fire department or vice versa about the, you know, the kind of 00:46:39.000 --> 00:46:48.280 push and pull between the, you know, do not drip your faucets and the, you know, fire 00:46:48.280 --> 00:46:53.160 department responding to so many line breaks. 00:46:53.160 --> 00:47:01.280 Interestingly both departments, it seems the demand was up about 700% roughly. 00:47:01.280 --> 00:47:05.120 So you know, based on what you mentioned. 00:47:05.120 --> 00:47:11.560 Yeah, so we, so council member Armentor, we always let the fire department know anytime 00:47:11.560 --> 00:47:19.800 that we have a tank, a level issue or a pressure issue is specifically so that they know if 00:47:19.800 --> 00:47:25.400 they're responding to a fire incident in part of the city that has a low pressure area, 00:47:25.400 --> 00:47:30.120 they know to be prepared for that by bringing tank trucks, etc. 00:47:30.120 --> 00:47:37.280 So we were also in communication with them, as I mentioned, four times a day as part of 00:47:37.280 --> 00:47:43.600 our, our daily communication with the city manager's office, fire department participated 00:47:43.600 --> 00:47:44.600 in that. 00:47:44.600 --> 00:47:51.400 So we were able to keep them up to speed on what measures we were taking. 00:47:51.400 --> 00:47:52.400 Thank you. 00:47:52.400 --> 00:47:59.160 And my next question is about requests for shutoffs and it's kind of divided into two 00:47:59.160 --> 00:48:05.320 parts and you can handle it however you want, businesses and apartments. 00:48:05.320 --> 00:48:13.480 So did you, were you aware of, you know, and this could be for pre tam or Terry or both, 00:48:13.480 --> 00:48:21.920 you know, aware of businesses that were not operational because of the, the, because the 00:48:21.920 --> 00:48:29.840 freeze shut down pretty much everything, almost everything, that did not request to have their 00:48:29.840 --> 00:48:40.440 water shut off that maybe could have both, you know, benefited those, those businesses 00:48:40.440 --> 00:48:49.040 and the community from both a conservation and infrastructure point of view if they had, 00:48:49.040 --> 00:48:55.240 you know, there had maybe been a, you know, some sort of communication to them that, you 00:48:55.240 --> 00:48:59.720 know, you might want to shut your water off or you have to shut your water off. 00:48:59.720 --> 00:49:12.640 And then as far as apartments go, you know, what, what is your sense of the degree of 00:49:12.640 --> 00:49:21.000 management owners who requested to have their water shut off out of concern for, you know, 00:49:21.000 --> 00:49:30.360 pipe damage that ended up leaving their water off for a long time, either out of concern 00:49:30.360 --> 00:49:38.280 about what could happen or out of legitimate, you know, insufficient, you know, improperly 00:49:38.280 --> 00:49:44.040 weatherized pipes. So if you could speak to both, I don't expect that you have concrete 00:49:44.040 --> 00:49:49.320 data on all this because you're responding to whoever's in touch with you, but just anecdotally 00:49:49.320 --> 00:49:56.200 kind of your sense of shutoffs for both businesses and apartments. 00:49:56.200 --> 00:50:02.200 I can start with addressing the apartment piece. I think apartments typically have on-site 00:50:02.200 --> 00:50:08.960 facility maintenance folks that are aware of where these valves are, where these shutoff 00:50:08.960 --> 00:50:16.240 points are, and that's what they typically use. So we don't believe that there were 00:50:16.240 --> 00:50:22.840 any significant calls, and I can find the exact numbers exactly of how many apartments 00:50:22.840 --> 00:50:28.560 reached out to us, but they have the ability to send that person out there and take care 00:50:28.560 --> 00:50:35.480 of some of the issues that they are experiencing on site. As far as businesses that were closed, 00:50:35.480 --> 00:50:44.640 and a lot of them were, if we did receive calls from, you know, residents or businesses 00:50:44.640 --> 00:50:52.480 nearby, then absolutely we addressed the concerns, but we did not actually reach out or attempt 00:50:52.480 --> 00:51:02.240 to address some of these extra calls or extra turnoffs at the time, just given the amount 00:51:02.240 --> 00:51:09.480 of calls that we're receiving from active residents to proactively engage more folks 00:51:09.480 --> 00:51:16.640 and do that kind of stuff. But I'll let Terry if he has anything to add to that. 00:51:16.640 --> 00:51:19.640 I don't. 00:51:19.640 --> 00:51:23.980 Thank you for answering that. That makes a lot of sense. You all are so busy, you're 00:51:23.980 --> 00:51:31.280 not going to be calling all the different businesses. I would hope that moving forward, 00:51:31.280 --> 00:51:37.040 those of us who have lived through this, business owners, property owners, renters, whoever, 00:51:37.040 --> 00:51:42.160 have a better sense of, okay, if this happens again or when this happens again, I'll make 00:51:42.160 --> 00:51:50.080 sure to shut off the water to my business before locking up the shop or whatever. And 00:51:50.080 --> 00:51:57.960 maybe with that 2020 hindsight, notice to business, and forgive me if this was already 00:51:57.960 --> 00:52:08.520 done, but notice to businesses, just a general notice on social media and whatnot, an emergency 00:52:08.520 --> 00:52:16.560 alert saying businesses, if you are shut down, please turn off your water. That probably 00:52:16.560 --> 00:52:26.480 happened already. But anyway, my final question is about mobile homes that depend on well 00:52:26.480 --> 00:52:34.880 water. And because of that, it's not a question about our water utility, our public water 00:52:34.880 --> 00:52:45.280 utility, but it is a question about public water need. And so I was just wondering if 00:52:45.280 --> 00:52:53.200 anything that you have heard anecdotally about mobile home communities that are dependent 00:52:53.200 --> 00:53:04.880 on well water, who are not able to get back to normal as quickly as people who were on 00:53:04.880 --> 00:53:19.800 city water. Yeah. We don't have any knowledge about mobile home renters or owners that aren't 00:53:19.800 --> 00:53:25.840 on our system. We wouldn't have any access to that information. 00:53:25.840 --> 00:53:32.300 And thank you. And I realize you don't have the access to that. I know that anecdotally 00:53:32.300 --> 00:53:38.480 I've heard and heard about, and I thought maybe y'all had to, about some communities 00:53:38.480 --> 00:53:46.440 who struggled for extra long because they didn't have this great resource that we're 00:53:46.440 --> 00:53:52.440 all talking about. So just something for all of us decision makers to think about moving 00:53:52.440 --> 00:54:01.200 forward as far as public water need. Okay. Other questions? I will make a quick 00:54:01.200 --> 00:54:07.560 programming note. The city council has a scheduled quote unquote luncheon meeting at noon. That'll 00:54:07.560 --> 00:54:13.400 be a different web link. Anybody who's watching along with this one and wants to see that 00:54:13.400 --> 00:54:17.400 meeting as well, that'll be a different web link and it'll be after the conclusion of 00:54:17.400 --> 00:54:22.800 this meeting in a short break. Council member Ryan, I think I saw your hand first. 00:54:22.800 --> 00:54:29.720 Thank you. I got just a couple of quick questions. One is, this is similar to what I was asking 00:54:29.720 --> 00:54:37.360 on the antifreeze at the power plant last week. On the chlorine, is there a way that 00:54:37.360 --> 00:54:43.960 if we had it at a stronger solution than what we currently have? Because I know chlorine 00:54:43.960 --> 00:54:49.320 has a very low freeze point. I mean, I think it's 150 below that pure chlorine freezes 00:54:49.320 --> 00:54:53.640 that. Is that something that we're looking at to make it or is that a regulatory that 00:54:53.640 --> 00:54:57.000 you're only allowed to use a certain strength and that's the strength that we had and that's 00:54:57.000 --> 00:55:00.760 what froze? I think I can start the answer, Terry, and 00:55:00.760 --> 00:55:08.800 what are the issues on the chlorine line was there was a valve that actually opens and 00:55:08.800 --> 00:55:14.800 connects to the water that is sitting in the tank and that valve kind of back leaked into 00:55:14.800 --> 00:55:19.640 the whole line, which froze the line. It's not necessarily the actual gas or liquid gas 00:55:19.640 --> 00:55:26.800 got frozen up. It was more of that malfunction of the active valve and if that ever happens 00:55:26.800 --> 00:55:32.200 again, yes, we're running into the same issue, but we're working on is coming up with a solution 00:55:32.200 --> 00:55:38.680 that doesn't happen and we address that. Okay. And then my other question is regarding 00:55:38.680 --> 00:55:45.160 meter keys because I know a lot of the local supply houses or big box stores, let's put 00:55:45.160 --> 00:55:53.440 it that way, sell meter keys that don't work on city meter boxes. As we go forward, does 00:55:53.440 --> 00:55:59.840 the city supply those or is that something that the developer would put in as they build 00:55:59.840 --> 00:56:04.860 out an area? Yeah, I don't have an answer if we supply 00:56:04.860 --> 00:56:10.120 it, but we can definitely get back to you as to how we can address this issue. 00:56:10.120 --> 00:56:14.080 Yeah. I'm just thinking the next time, if the city supplies them, the next time we go 00:56:14.080 --> 00:56:18.880 to order them to see if there's some that work with a little bit more wide range of 00:56:18.880 --> 00:56:24.960 key varieties, because I know I have the neighbor across the street had borrowed a key from 00:56:24.960 --> 00:56:29.520 another neighbor and spent, he was out there for 10 minutes, then another neighbor came 00:56:29.520 --> 00:56:33.960 out and they worked on it for another 15 minutes. I've got one that works. I walked over there 00:56:33.960 --> 00:56:40.200 and twisted and it was up. So if you're trying to shut off that water in a hurry, that makes 00:56:40.200 --> 00:56:49.720 a huge difference. Absolutely. Board member Divini, did I see your hand 00:56:49.720 --> 00:56:55.340 a little while ago? Yeah, I just had a sort of rookie question 00:56:55.340 --> 00:57:03.040 about what difference summer demand would make. Obviously, there was a question because 00:57:03.040 --> 00:57:09.600 demand went up, but the demand would not have been as high as it is on a typical day in 00:57:09.600 --> 00:57:15.960 the summer. So I was wondering just how important water demand was considering that we have 00:57:15.960 --> 00:57:20.840 times of the year when demand is much, much higher than the winter demand. 00:57:20.840 --> 00:57:30.640 Yes. Great question. So we do have seasonal maintenance activities that we're performing 00:57:30.640 --> 00:57:37.480 at the facilities and during the low flow winter periods is when we're performing our 00:57:37.480 --> 00:57:44.760 major maintenance activities. Fortunately, we were not in an outage of any type on either 00:57:44.760 --> 00:57:52.880 of the plants during this time, but we were not prepared to be able to produce 30 million 00:57:52.880 --> 00:58:00.480 gallons per day in the middle of the winter. We just don't set up our operations that way. 00:58:00.480 --> 00:58:06.520 Now that we've seen this incident, we'll be taking measures to make sure that we have 00:58:06.520 --> 00:58:12.120 the ability to do that. Councilmember Meltzer? 00:58:12.120 --> 00:58:23.840 Thank you. With 2020 hindsight, now we would say there's simply no way that people are 00:58:23.840 --> 00:58:32.080 going to conserve water when they need to drip in order to avoid $52500 worth of damage. 00:58:32.080 --> 00:58:36.280 If we started with that point of view, if this were to magically happen exactly the 00:58:36.280 --> 00:58:44.240 same way, would we have given different communication? Like could we have prepared people for the 00:58:44.240 --> 00:58:53.680 clear trending toward boil water notice? But if we see it sooner, instead of saying stop 00:58:53.680 --> 00:58:58.600 dripping, which they're not going to do, would we have given different advice? Do X to prepare 00:58:58.600 --> 00:59:05.000 for the boil water notice that is inevitably coming? 00:59:05.000 --> 00:59:11.440 Let me try to answer that, Councilmember Meltzer. I think that first, we'd never experienced 00:59:11.440 --> 00:59:22.360 this level of freezing for as long as it took place. Normally we'd have our tanks full and 00:59:22.360 --> 00:59:28.800 we'd be filling them back up at night. The level of dripping that we would expect for 00:59:28.800 --> 00:59:32.840 an incident like this would have not been an issue. We should have been able to handle 00:59:32.840 --> 00:59:38.440 it. But the fact that our production facilities were impacted at the same time that we had 00:59:38.440 --> 00:59:45.920 this large demand and we couldn't remedy those production issues because of the weather, 00:59:45.920 --> 00:59:55.380 that was really the problem. As I mentioned, it was unfortunate that we had to issue directives 00:59:55.380 --> 01:00:01.600 or recommendations about dripping water to protect your pipes and then come out and say, 01:00:01.600 --> 01:00:09.880 well, we really need you to conserve now. That conservation message was really focused 01:00:09.880 --> 01:00:15.880 on the public safety aspect of making sure we had enough water if forgotten. 01:00:15.880 --> 01:00:20.400 I'm not saying it critically. I understand entirely what the thought process was, but 01:00:20.400 --> 01:00:30.600 now we have the benefit of 20/40 hindsight. That's why I'm saying knowing what we now 01:00:30.600 --> 01:00:36.020 know about behavior and whatever. Obviously, ideally we're going to plan ahead and the 01:00:36.020 --> 01:00:44.880 situation won't recur, but it could. Maybe don't answer now. 01:00:44.880 --> 01:00:51.200 I really appreciate your point and I wholeheartedly agree with you that if we could figure out 01:00:51.200 --> 01:00:55.680 something that we could have done, and I guess the answer to that would be have our production 01:00:55.680 --> 01:01:02.840 facilities in better shape from a weatherization perspective so that we don't end up in a situation 01:01:02.840 --> 01:01:04.400 where we can't meet the demand. 01:01:04.400 --> 01:01:12.960 I totally get that, but okay. I'm not going to press for an answer, but maybe there is 01:01:12.960 --> 01:01:20.760 something that people could be advised to do in the time before if some other set of 01:01:20.760 --> 01:01:29.060 circumstances converge so that we do face some kind of situation like this. Despite 01:01:29.060 --> 01:01:34.520 our best efforts, is there something we could say in the hours before a boiled water notice 01:01:34.520 --> 01:01:36.800 that would help people prepare? 01:01:36.800 --> 01:01:43.080 I really appreciate the suggestion and we'll certainly look at it to see if there is something 01:01:43.080 --> 01:01:56.400 we can do. With respect to boiled water advisories, we could have potentially notified citizens 01:01:56.400 --> 01:02:03.640 that levels in tanks were getting progressively lower and that delivery pressures were getting 01:02:03.640 --> 01:02:08.700 lower and that there was a potential for boiled water advisory, but I think that would have 01:02:08.700 --> 01:02:14.600 the same effect as the social media posting I mentioned, which was, "Hey, let's fill our 01:02:14.600 --> 01:02:15.820 bathtubs now." 01:02:15.820 --> 01:02:17.840 Well, it's not irrational, right? 01:02:17.840 --> 01:02:24.780 No, it's not. It's a perfectly rational thought process and I don't fault anyone for posting 01:02:24.780 --> 01:02:27.480 that or for taking those actions. 01:02:27.480 --> 01:02:30.240 It just precipitates the thing you know is coming. 01:02:30.240 --> 01:02:37.000 It's kind of like a snowball going downhill, right? The problem gets more and more compounded. 01:02:37.000 --> 01:02:45.160 But maybe there's advice like, just to take a little honing, but we know you're going 01:02:45.160 --> 01:02:53.400 to want to set some water aside, limit it to a gallon or I don't know. 01:02:53.400 --> 01:02:56.760 I think that's a great idea. Yeah, I think that's a great idea. 01:02:56.760 --> 01:03:02.060 Council Member Meltzer, I think from this whole incident that occurred and it pretty 01:03:02.060 --> 01:03:08.480 much showed us where we have some efforts to focus on. That is one, being more proactive 01:03:08.480 --> 01:03:14.560 in preparing our information for sharing with the public. So as you've heard several of 01:03:14.560 --> 01:03:18.480 them say, they were going to go back and look at their emergency operations plans and the 01:03:18.480 --> 01:03:24.440 media part of it and start to develop sort of fact sheets and things that we can then 01:03:24.440 --> 01:03:26.880 have on hand to pull out. 01:03:26.880 --> 01:03:32.200 We also need to help educate our population about, you know, exactly what happened here 01:03:32.200 --> 01:03:37.440 you heard today is what happens when you have a freeze to this extent and the lines that 01:03:37.440 --> 01:03:43.680 we have to maintain are frozen, can't get our generators going and then our water levels 01:03:43.680 --> 01:03:48.640 go down. It really is then a matter of us sharing with the public that while in some 01:03:48.640 --> 01:03:54.360 cases we'd ask you to drip, this is a matter of having water available from an emergency 01:03:54.360 --> 01:04:00.200 circumstance to not drip. And I think it's just a matter of how we start to help share 01:04:00.200 --> 01:04:05.080 these messages so that we're prepared better if and when this happens to us again. 01:04:05.080 --> 01:04:09.160 Well, I, you know, I'm going to go over it over and over and I'm not, I'm not saying 01:04:09.160 --> 01:04:16.040 this out of criticism. I mean, I know that you guys were doing, you know, amazingly difficult 01:04:16.040 --> 01:04:22.440 simultaneous, you know, emergency response situations. So it's not my tenor. It's just, 01:04:22.440 --> 01:04:28.760 you know, okay, what would, you know, just what can we learn? But I don't think what 01:04:28.760 --> 01:04:32.800 we learned is if you explain it better to people, they would stop dripping. I mean, 01:04:32.800 --> 01:04:35.560 my starting point is they're never going to do that. 01:04:35.560 --> 01:04:37.200 No, no, they won't. You're absolutely right. 01:04:37.200 --> 01:04:38.200 Increasing temperatures. 01:04:38.200 --> 01:04:42.400 Yeah. I think it's just, we want to, I think most importantly, we want to help explain 01:04:42.400 --> 01:04:47.840 to the public sort of what has happened, which we're doing and, and what we would do differently 01:04:47.840 --> 01:04:52.400 in the future. You know, this, hopefully we won't experience this, but it looks like it 01:04:52.400 --> 01:04:56.920 happens about every eight to 10 years and we may be up for it again. 01:04:56.920 --> 01:04:58.480 Yep. Thank you. 01:04:58.480 --> 01:05:02.560 Thank you all for that exchange. And I think those are fair questions and fair answers. 01:05:02.560 --> 01:05:06.120 I don't think anybody really expected quite the sequence of events. We've all lived through 01:05:06.120 --> 01:05:10.600 hard freezes, right? We know kind of what to do, but the, the sequence of events this 01:05:10.600 --> 01:05:15.240 time around was a little different. Mr. Sof. 01:05:15.240 --> 01:05:24.600 Yes. Thank you. Um, when this happened, um, state regulators seemingly almost tried to 01:05:24.600 --> 01:05:33.800 downplay the freeze and its impacts by saying it was unprecedented. Uh, it wasn't unprecedented 01:05:33.800 --> 01:05:40.360 as city manager just pointed out, these things happen and are happening, happening more frequently 01:05:40.360 --> 01:05:45.840 just as spring is getting here earlier. All sorts of strange things are happening with 01:05:45.840 --> 01:05:52.280 the climate. And I think anything that we can do to prepare for the worst and hope for 01:05:52.280 --> 01:06:02.120 the best is what we should do. And, um, that's just as a general comment. I mean, uh, rather 01:06:02.120 --> 01:06:07.800 than, I feel that rather than looking for reasons not to do things, we should look for 01:06:07.800 --> 01:06:18.080 reasons in some cases to definitely do things based upon scientific data. Thank you. 01:06:18.080 --> 01:06:24.460 Thank you, Mr. Sof. Other questions for staff? Um, I've got just one kind of along the lines 01:06:24.460 --> 01:06:31.000 of what Ed was just talking about. Um, financially, it may not be the most feasible thing, but 01:06:31.000 --> 01:06:38.200 from a regulatory standpoint, are we, um, we have a good neighbor with co-serve, uh, 01:06:38.200 --> 01:06:44.640 they, they service our Ray Roberts plant usually without incident. Um, but you know, if that 01:06:44.640 --> 01:06:48.640 had been an in-house thing, if DME had service that plant, then maybe we would have known 01:06:48.640 --> 01:06:56.280 which, which feeder, which circuit our own water plant was on. Um, is it, uh, is it feasible 01:06:56.280 --> 01:07:02.680 not necessarily for financial standpoint, but from a, uh, a technological and a technical 01:07:02.680 --> 01:07:09.080 and regulatory standpoint, is it feasible and possible to, uh, power the Ray Roberts 01:07:09.080 --> 01:07:14.880 water plant from DME or some measure of backup besides just the generators? 01:07:14.880 --> 01:07:21.760 Uh, yes, sir. It is, uh, we could run a line up there. It is a dual-serve area and we could 01:07:21.760 --> 01:07:29.120 run a line up there. It's just cost prohibitive. And, uh, I know as we talk about reliability 01:07:29.120 --> 01:07:36.080 of our water system, it seems a little ironic to talk about cost, um, where the difference 01:07:36.080 --> 01:07:42.480 might've been, uh, uh, that we were able to run the plant a little bit better, but, um, 01:07:42.480 --> 01:07:46.920 it's very expensive. I can't remember the exact mileage to run it up there, but it's 01:07:46.920 --> 01:07:56.800 several million dollars, uh, to run a service up there. And again, our, our, our, uh, co-serve 01:07:56.800 --> 01:08:01.840 itself has been very cooperative since the storm. And in fact, during the middle of the 01:08:01.840 --> 01:08:08.400 storm, uh, rotated, took us off the rotation and put us on a critical service. So we feel 01:08:08.400 --> 01:08:14.800 pretty good that the, uh, the service that we're getting for that facility, uh, is improving. 01:08:14.800 --> 01:08:19.880 And as I mentioned, we will upgrade, uh, as part of the regulatory upgrade program, we'll 01:08:19.880 --> 01:08:28.200 be looking at integrating, uh, relays and sensor, sensing equipment into our, into our 01:08:28.200 --> 01:08:33.480 generators so that they will automatically come online and we shouldn't see the kind 01:08:33.480 --> 01:08:40.000 of interruption that, that, uh, Preetam mentioned requires us to go out and re-recheck all the 01:08:40.000 --> 01:08:45.520 equipment. We can put some technology in place that will enable that, that generator to start 01:08:45.520 --> 01:08:50.820 up automatically due to power quality issues. Um, that will, that will go a long way to 01:08:50.820 --> 01:08:53.740 improving the reliability of the facility. 01:08:53.740 --> 01:08:59.580 Much cheaper to soup up the generators than to run in millions of dollars worth of power 01:08:59.580 --> 01:09:03.980 lines. And I imagine that's probably, that's a dual service area. I'm sure that's an analysis 01:09:03.980 --> 01:09:08.880 we did when we built that plant as well, why we have co-serve power out there. Uh, Mr. 01:09:08.880 --> 01:09:10.160 Sheik. 01:09:10.160 --> 01:09:15.280 Just one quick thing, and I'll continue to praise staff on the job that they did and 01:09:15.280 --> 01:09:21.400 getting people out and getting out there, um, keeping us, keeping us alive. I really appreciate 01:09:21.400 --> 01:09:28.040 it. Um, one recommendation we, there was a plan about 15, 20 years ago at the CFDN where 01:09:28.040 --> 01:09:35.160 they outreached the various departments to business community for emergency help. Um, 01:09:35.160 --> 01:09:40.320 I suggest that you look into that as well. I think there's some help to be had there. 01:09:40.320 --> 01:09:46.320 Um, I think a lot of businesses, what I'm involved with, when it's freezes outside, 01:09:46.320 --> 01:09:51.960 we don't do a lot. So all we can do is help with the equipment that we have. And I think 01:09:51.960 --> 01:09:57.640 there's a lot of other businesses out there that can contribute. That was it. 01:09:57.640 --> 01:10:06.400 That's a great point, Bill. Thank you. Other questions for staff? Go ahead, Councilmember 01:10:06.400 --> 01:10:07.400 Johnson. 01:10:07.400 --> 01:10:14.160 We were able to get those water mains repaired and up and running within, uh, a day or that 01:10:14.160 --> 01:10:21.440 day or so. I recognize the fact that we have water mains that break summer and winter. 01:10:21.440 --> 01:10:25.640 So I guess that there is really going to not be a real solution to whether or not they 01:10:25.640 --> 01:10:31.640 break or not. But I think that the most important really is that we get them up and running 01:10:31.640 --> 01:10:36.760 as quickly as possible so that people don't have to go without water and as well as the 01:10:36.760 --> 01:10:43.200 streets that are going to be torn up because of that. So were we able to work within that 01:10:43.200 --> 01:10:49.960 week or in that few days of getting those that were broken during that time up and running? 01:10:49.960 --> 01:10:54.760 Correct. We, we were able to get a majority of them up and running. There were a couple 01:10:54.760 --> 01:11:03.040 that were isolated that had some additional issues. But as a result of that isolation, 01:11:03.040 --> 01:11:08.800 the service was not impacted to the residents. We were able to circulate or bypass those 01:11:08.800 --> 01:11:16.600 areas and then come back and do the repairs. But yes, majority of them were repaired within 01:11:16.600 --> 01:11:21.240 acceptable time limits. This is where we had some extra help from our wastewater folks 01:11:21.240 --> 01:11:29.840 coming in and helping us to address them quickly. 01:11:29.840 --> 01:11:36.840 Any other questions on this agenda item? Very good. Seeing none, I want to echo Mr. Cheek 01:11:36.840 --> 01:11:42.720 and thanks staff for their excellent response during this event. A million things happening 01:11:42.720 --> 01:11:50.440 at once. Each next step was uncertain. And, and board member DaVinci's got found the applause 01:11:50.440 --> 01:11:56.760 button there on zoom. So just a quick program note, as we close out, we do have the council 01:11:56.760 --> 01:12:02.040 luncheon coming up. We're going to start that at 1220 for council members. It's a different 01:12:02.040 --> 01:12:06.200 zoom link. It's a different web link for those following along at home. And we'll start that 01:12:06.200 --> 01:12:12.360 at 1220. So at this time, I will conclude the Denton city council meeting and Mr. Cheek 01:12:12.360 --> 01:12:18.120 and we'll stand adjourned with the BUB. Thanks, y'all. Thank you.