1
00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:06,880
 Good morning and welcome to this joint meeting of the Denton City Council and Public Utility

2
00:00:06,880 --> 00:00:07,880
 Board.

3
00:00:07,880 --> 00:00:11,920
 It is 11 a.m. on the 5th of April, 2021.

4
00:00:11,920 --> 00:00:16,600
 I'm Mayor Pro Tem Jesse Davis, your regularly scheduled mayor, is unavoidably detained with

5
00:00:16,600 --> 00:00:18,760
 a work obligation.

6
00:00:18,760 --> 00:00:22,320
 But at this time, being a joint meeting, I'll first open the council meeting and then Vice

7
00:00:22,320 --> 00:00:25,160
 Chair Bill Cheek will open the PUB meeting.

8
00:00:25,160 --> 00:00:29,960
 So at this time, I call to order this meeting of the Denton City Council.

9
00:00:29,960 --> 00:00:36,640
 Thank you, Mayor Pro Tem, I'm Bill Cheek, I'm Vice Chair of the Public Utility Board.

10
00:00:36,640 --> 00:00:42,180
 If we didn't, it is 11 a.m. and I will call the Public Utility Board, joint meeting of

11
00:00:42,180 --> 00:00:43,960
 the City Council Board.

12
00:00:43,960 --> 00:00:44,960
 Thank you, Mr. Cheek.

13
00:00:44,960 --> 00:00:46,680
 I will call our one and only item.

14
00:00:46,680 --> 00:00:51,080
 This is a continuation of a meeting that we had back on the 23rd of March and we're not

15
00:00:51,080 --> 00:00:54,440
 able to get to this last item.

16
00:00:54,440 --> 00:01:01,120
 It is 1 a.i.d. 2 1 6 2 1, receive a report, hold a discussion, and give staff direction

17
00:01:01,120 --> 00:01:06,480
 regarding processes, impacts, and results of service delivery during the February 2021

18
00:01:06,480 --> 00:01:12,160
 inclement weather event by the Water and Wastewater Utilities Department.

19
00:01:12,160 --> 00:01:23,880
 Good morning, Mayor Pro Tem, members of the council, Vice Chair, and members of the PUB.

20
00:01:23,880 --> 00:01:28,280
 I'm Preet Sam Deshmukh, Deputy Director for Water and Wastewater Utilities, and I will

21
00:01:28,280 --> 00:01:35,000
 be talking about our report on the remainder items from the utility side of things.

22
00:01:35,000 --> 00:01:41,560
 Let me start by quickly sharing the screen and then we'll go from there.

23
00:01:41,560 --> 00:01:54,560
 Let me know if you can see the screen.

24
00:01:54,560 --> 00:01:57,800
 So it is a tag team effort.

25
00:01:57,800 --> 00:02:04,640
 I will be going through the majority, almost 80% of the presentation, and will be joined

26
00:02:04,640 --> 00:02:11,720
 towards the end, last couple slides by Terry Nolte, who has also been an interim director

27
00:02:11,720 --> 00:02:19,400
 for the water/wastewater side of things and as we had transitioned into getting a new

28
00:02:19,400 --> 00:02:23,960
 director, and I go through that in a little bit.

29
00:02:23,960 --> 00:02:25,840
 So quick agenda.

30
00:02:25,840 --> 00:02:31,900
 I will start on the water side of things, go through all the different areas, talk about

31
00:02:31,900 --> 00:02:41,320
 our operation impact due to the storm, what changes we had to make or change in operation,

32
00:02:41,320 --> 00:02:46,200
 and then talk about lessons learned and improvements.

33
00:02:46,200 --> 00:02:51,560
 Kind of similar things on the wastewater side, and then go into specifically talking about

34
00:02:51,560 --> 00:02:58,000
 the public communication piece of this whole storm event, and then overall lessons learned

35
00:02:58,000 --> 00:02:59,000
 and improvement.

36
00:02:59,000 --> 00:03:03,040
 So there are opportunities that we have to improve some of our operations and some of

37
00:03:03,040 --> 00:03:08,200
 the stuff that we're working on, and ultimately kind of close it on a high note of what exactly

38
00:03:08,200 --> 00:03:12,200
 worked during the storm event.

39
00:03:12,200 --> 00:03:15,980
 So let's start with the water department operation.

40
00:03:15,980 --> 00:03:22,360
 Our operation is primarily divided into four areas, starting with the treatment side of

41
00:03:22,360 --> 00:03:27,400
 things, it's also called water production, which is where we take in water from lakes

42
00:03:27,400 --> 00:03:35,720
 and treated and supply it to the residents and our customers here.

43
00:03:35,720 --> 00:03:41,760
 So we typically, we have two water treatment plants, typical demand during the winter season

44
00:03:41,760 --> 00:03:44,640
 is about 13 to 15 MGD.

45
00:03:44,640 --> 00:03:48,260
 When I say MGD, it's a million gallons per day.

46
00:03:48,260 --> 00:03:53,880
 So we're talking about a demand that's up to 15 million gallons.

47
00:03:53,880 --> 00:03:58,200
 If you can see the breakdown, we have two treatment facilities.

48
00:03:58,200 --> 00:04:04,760
 One is a Lake Louisville older facility that's in the heart of the city, and it treats about

49
00:04:04,760 --> 00:04:11,560
 10 million gallons a day for taking care of the demand during the winter season.

50
00:04:11,560 --> 00:04:18,560
 And Ray Roberts, which is closer to the Lake Ray Robert, right next to the dam, it treats

51
00:04:18,560 --> 00:04:23,280
 about three to five million gallons a day during the winter time.

52
00:04:23,280 --> 00:04:27,880
 The next area for our operation is the storage capacity.

53
00:04:27,880 --> 00:04:35,680
 We currently have five elevated tanks that amount to a total of 11 million gallons, and

54
00:04:35,680 --> 00:04:41,640
 then three ground storage tank, two of them are the larger ones are on site at the treatment

55
00:04:41,640 --> 00:04:45,200
 facilities and they're about 14 million gallons.

56
00:04:45,200 --> 00:04:50,960
 So total storage capacity that we have, it's 25 million gallons.

57
00:04:50,960 --> 00:04:53,640
 Then we obviously have the pipes in the ground.

58
00:04:53,640 --> 00:04:55,200
 It is our distribution system.

59
00:04:55,200 --> 00:04:58,560
 We have larger pipes and smaller pipes and so on and so forth.

60
00:04:58,560 --> 00:05:06,720
 Our main focus in that distribution system is to maintain a consistent pressure between

61
00:05:06,720 --> 00:05:10,320
 50 and 80 pounds per square inch.

62
00:05:10,320 --> 00:05:16,440
 So we have to maintain that pressure so that in any time in the system, the water is not

63
00:05:16,440 --> 00:05:22,920
 stagnant, it's continuously moving and that pressure itself identifies that yes, the water

64
00:05:22,920 --> 00:05:26,200
 is moving in the system and getting delivered to the places.

65
00:05:26,200 --> 00:05:33,480
 And then last but not least, our customer facing or residential facing area of operation

66
00:05:33,480 --> 00:05:39,580
 is the metering where we have all the residential meters and commercial and compound meters.

67
00:05:39,580 --> 00:05:47,280
 We have approximately 39,000 residential meters and that is our final area of function within

68
00:05:47,280 --> 00:05:49,280
 the water department.

69
00:05:49,280 --> 00:05:54,320
 So I'm going to go a little bit into what exactly happened and why it happened.

70
00:05:54,320 --> 00:05:59,440
 There were primarily two main reasons of what happened.

71
00:05:59,440 --> 00:06:05,440
 We on the water production side of things, we were not able to maintain a constant treatment

72
00:06:05,440 --> 00:06:12,540
 plant output because of a couple of things, one was the rolling outages and freezing temperatures.

73
00:06:12,540 --> 00:06:14,800
 So that really impacted our operation.

74
00:06:14,800 --> 00:06:18,040
 We're not able to maintain a constant plant output.

75
00:06:18,040 --> 00:06:24,240
 And then the second thing happened was the peak demand was increased, almost doubled,

76
00:06:24,240 --> 00:06:33,160
 went from a typical demand of 15 million gallons to a 13 million gallon a day, primarily caused

77
00:06:33,160 --> 00:06:39,640
 due to some of the dripping faucets, and we had issued some conservation requests, made

78
00:06:39,640 --> 00:06:41,080
 some public appeals.

79
00:06:41,080 --> 00:06:43,640
 We'll go through that in a little bit.

80
00:06:43,640 --> 00:06:48,120
 Those were the two primary reasons is not able to maintain a constant output and then

81
00:06:48,120 --> 00:06:51,840
 a considerably higher demand for this time of the year.

82
00:06:51,840 --> 00:06:53,680
 So why did it happen?

83
00:06:53,680 --> 00:06:59,220
 In the treatment facilities, I'll start with Ray Robert treatment plant that was really

84
00:06:59,220 --> 00:07:03,320
 impacted severely as compared to Lake Louisville.

85
00:07:03,320 --> 00:07:08,400
 Ray Robert facility had five outages within a six hour time period.

86
00:07:08,400 --> 00:07:14,040
 This was starting 6 a.m. early morning, Monday morning, and went through noon.

87
00:07:14,040 --> 00:07:21,600
 And just to give an idea of what happens once an outage kicks in, it actually impacts all

88
00:07:21,600 --> 00:07:22,880
 the aspects of the plan.

89
00:07:22,880 --> 00:07:27,660
 So the operators have then have to go through the plan and look at every operation to make

90
00:07:27,660 --> 00:07:33,240
 sure that everything is back to normal and then give the thumbs up for the whole operation

91
00:07:33,240 --> 00:07:34,240
 to begin.

92
00:07:34,240 --> 00:07:38,080
 So it takes a while for us to go back once one outage happened.

93
00:07:38,080 --> 00:07:43,040
 Then imagine that in a series and sequence, you have five happening and just disrupted

94
00:07:43,040 --> 00:07:46,420
 the production side of things.

95
00:07:46,420 --> 00:07:52,840
 The other thing that did happen, we had an ozone generator failure right around the time

96
00:07:52,840 --> 00:07:55,480
 during this Monday power outages.

97
00:07:55,480 --> 00:08:03,120
 We also had some impacts due to the weather on the backup generators and then also some

98
00:08:03,120 --> 00:08:06,800
 of the chlorine feed lines, which are fairly exposed.

99
00:08:06,800 --> 00:08:15,120
 They're not buried down in the ground or they're not necessarily insulated, if you may.

100
00:08:15,120 --> 00:08:19,240
 They froze up and that created some challenges for us.

101
00:08:19,240 --> 00:08:25,240
 On the Lake Louisville treatment side of things, we had some issues with the intake bumps.

102
00:08:25,240 --> 00:08:32,720
 So typically when we say we're treating water, there is an area near the lake where we have

103
00:08:32,720 --> 00:08:38,840
 intake pumps, which actually pull water out of the lake and then send it to the treatment

104
00:08:38,840 --> 00:08:39,840
 facility.

105
00:08:39,840 --> 00:08:41,380
 So we were having issues.

106
00:08:41,380 --> 00:08:48,240
 We have four intake pumps at this particular location and due to electric phase imbalance,

107
00:08:48,240 --> 00:08:49,880
 only two were operational.

108
00:08:49,880 --> 00:08:56,120
 So that considerably impacted our capacity to pull water out of the lake and get it to

109
00:08:56,120 --> 00:08:57,480
 the plant for getting treated.

110
00:08:57,480 --> 00:09:01,740
 So that's where that particular plant was impacted.

111
00:09:01,740 --> 00:09:04,560
 As you can see, there were impacts to both these plants.

112
00:09:04,560 --> 00:09:11,760
 Ultimately, our water production capacity was considerably constrained for the three

113
00:09:11,760 --> 00:09:16,760
 days between Monday and Wednesday during that snowstorm week.

114
00:09:16,760 --> 00:09:21,080
 Oops, sorry, I jumped.

115
00:09:21,080 --> 00:09:25,640
 So what happened on the other types of areas that we are involved in?

116
00:09:25,640 --> 00:09:32,840
 On the storage side, as I mentioned earlier, there was a significant increase in the demand.

117
00:09:32,840 --> 00:09:38,280
 It went from a typical 15 million gallons a day to 30.

118
00:09:38,280 --> 00:09:42,600
 And there was a constraint on the plant production side.

119
00:09:42,600 --> 00:09:48,920
 So you can see both these really contributed to this storage issue.

120
00:09:48,920 --> 00:09:53,800
 Because the demand was high, all the stored water in our storage facility started draining

121
00:09:53,800 --> 00:09:55,800
 very quickly.

122
00:09:55,800 --> 00:09:59,040
 And you can see on this side, you can see some of these grafts.

123
00:09:59,040 --> 00:10:02,480
 You can see the drop in some of the water levels.

124
00:10:02,480 --> 00:10:08,040
 So at some point, we're down in certain tanks, it was really minimal.

125
00:10:08,040 --> 00:10:15,240
 But overall, system-wide, we were down to 10% to 15% of the storage capacity.

126
00:10:15,240 --> 00:10:22,360
 So that was a really critical element that we had to monitor constantly.

127
00:10:22,360 --> 00:10:28,440
 Because it did impact one of the key concerns here was public safety.

128
00:10:28,440 --> 00:10:33,720
 So if we did not have enough water in our storage system and did not have enough water

129
00:10:33,720 --> 00:10:42,760
 to pump out when it's needed, it created a public hazard or public health issue in case

130
00:10:42,760 --> 00:10:48,000
 there was significant fire, in case there were significant other emergencies that required

131
00:10:48,000 --> 00:10:49,000
 water.

132
00:10:49,000 --> 00:10:50,000
 So that was critical.

133
00:10:50,000 --> 00:10:51,320
 We were monitoring constantly.

134
00:10:51,320 --> 00:10:57,280
 I do want to point out that that was a concern that staff was constantly looking at.

135
00:10:57,280 --> 00:11:04,080
 On the distribution side, where the pipes in the ground, because of the freezing temperatures,

136
00:11:04,080 --> 00:11:06,400
 we had more than normal average breaks.

137
00:11:06,400 --> 00:11:11,880
 Typically, we have about three breaks a week during the month of February or throughout

138
00:11:11,880 --> 00:11:13,800
 the winter itself.

139
00:11:13,800 --> 00:11:20,980
 And in this particular week where the storm hit, we had 16 water main breaks.

140
00:11:20,980 --> 00:11:28,760
 And then obviously on the meter side, we had a significant increase in requests from residents,

141
00:11:28,760 --> 00:11:36,200
 not just to turn off water, but also report some of the leaks.

142
00:11:36,200 --> 00:11:41,680
 And typically, we get about 90 tickets a week from residents, meaning they will call in

143
00:11:41,680 --> 00:11:47,320
 and provide concerns that, hey, we need to turn off water, and there were issues with

144
00:11:47,320 --> 00:11:49,640
 our connection.

145
00:11:49,640 --> 00:11:53,020
 In that particular week, we had 740 tickets.

146
00:11:53,020 --> 00:11:58,280
 So as you can see, there is a considerable impact on our operation on the water side

147
00:11:58,280 --> 00:12:03,840
 of things, not just at the plants, but every single aspect of our operation was impacted

148
00:12:03,840 --> 00:12:04,840
 during that week.

149
00:12:04,840 --> 00:12:07,960
 Obviously, there were some other concerns that were happening.

150
00:12:07,960 --> 00:12:11,560
 We had staff that had to continuously work around the clock.

151
00:12:11,560 --> 00:12:16,460
 We have a specific number of plant operators that had to continually work.

152
00:12:16,460 --> 00:12:19,120
 We had to schedule them appropriately.

153
00:12:19,120 --> 00:12:25,960
 There were some staffing issues with our technical staff, our electrical staff that was attending

154
00:12:25,960 --> 00:12:31,440
 some of these pumps and voltage and phase imbalances had to be reassigned.

155
00:12:31,440 --> 00:12:33,200
 So we had some concern.

156
00:12:33,200 --> 00:12:35,760
 We had some staffing issues there.

157
00:12:35,760 --> 00:12:38,520
 Also, there was unreliable communication.

158
00:12:38,520 --> 00:12:45,640
 Some of these towers for cell phone and some of the communication towers were impacted

159
00:12:45,640 --> 00:12:51,840
 because of the power outages, and we were not getting reliable and constant communication.

160
00:12:51,840 --> 00:12:59,200
 You can actually see some of these graphs don't have a full reading set because of unreliable

161
00:12:59,200 --> 00:13:03,280
 communication in our network and in our SCADA system.

162
00:13:03,280 --> 00:13:09,080
 And then last but not least, obviously, transporting things had become an issue due to the conditions

163
00:13:09,080 --> 00:13:10,080
 on the road.

164
00:13:10,080 --> 00:13:12,720
 The roads were sleek, ice everywhere.

165
00:13:12,720 --> 00:13:17,440
 It was very difficult and I'll come to the point why that transportation piece was also

166
00:13:17,440 --> 00:13:24,360
 impacting our operation and when we get to what exactly did we change and how did we

167
00:13:24,360 --> 00:13:27,720
 deal with these different things.

168
00:13:27,720 --> 00:13:30,360
 So mitigation, what did we do?

169
00:13:30,360 --> 00:13:35,720
 As these problems were happening, the first thing we wanted to make sure that we actually

170
00:13:35,720 --> 00:13:40,920
 addressed our main concern, which was the public safety concern.

171
00:13:40,920 --> 00:13:47,440
 So we did issue a request for residents to start conserving water because we had that

172
00:13:47,440 --> 00:13:54,960
 constraint capacity at the treatment facilities and then also considerable high demand for

173
00:13:54,960 --> 00:13:57,160
 the three straight days.

174
00:13:57,160 --> 00:14:05,760
 So the Ray Roberts plant on Monday, as these power outages were very frequently occurring,

175
00:14:05,760 --> 00:14:07,440
 we switched to the generators.

176
00:14:07,440 --> 00:14:14,040
 Initially, we had some issues with the generators, but we were able to overcome those issues

177
00:14:14,040 --> 00:14:19,300
 and then restored continuous power supply to the treatment facility.

178
00:14:19,300 --> 00:14:27,160
 We also had to bring in our in-house electrical folks to replace some of the damaged electronic

179
00:14:27,160 --> 00:14:36,680
 components in the ozone generator, which was impacted due to the outages and fluctuation

180
00:14:36,680 --> 00:14:39,080
 in electricity there.

181
00:14:39,080 --> 00:14:44,080
 And then last, we had to change our chlorination process.

182
00:14:44,080 --> 00:14:52,280
 So since the pipes that were providing chlorine to the water were frozen, we began using bleach

183
00:14:52,280 --> 00:14:53,520
 to chlorinate.

184
00:14:53,520 --> 00:15:00,120
 And you can see on this side of the screen actually a picture showing our folks bringing

185
00:15:00,120 --> 00:15:02,040
 in bleach on trucks.

186
00:15:02,040 --> 00:15:07,040
 There's a tote sitting on top of it, and that's where the transportation was required.

187
00:15:07,040 --> 00:15:12,640
 This is where we required folks from another department to help us to move this bleach

188
00:15:12,640 --> 00:15:18,840
 and bring it and feed it externally to chlorinate water.

189
00:15:18,840 --> 00:15:23,920
 And I do want to point out one thing when you say bleach and chlorinate water, this

190
00:15:23,920 --> 00:15:26,120
 is a standard process.

191
00:15:26,120 --> 00:15:31,240
 It has been used on the other treatment facility, so this is not something new that we had to

192
00:15:31,240 --> 00:15:34,600
 invent or it's not a tried and tested method.

193
00:15:34,600 --> 00:15:36,020
 It is a tried and tested.

194
00:15:36,020 --> 00:15:37,940
 We are already using this.

195
00:15:37,940 --> 00:15:45,200
 So switching to that particular process really helped us continue operation at this particular

196
00:15:45,200 --> 00:15:46,960
 treatment facility.

197
00:15:46,960 --> 00:15:54,200
 On the Lake Louisville treatment facility, there were considerable issues with the electric

198
00:15:54,200 --> 00:15:56,760
 supply phase imbalance.

199
00:15:56,760 --> 00:16:04,280
 And we had to work not only water staff, but we had to work with DME staff tirelessly for

200
00:16:04,280 --> 00:16:11,280
 three straight days to troubleshoot every single piece of not just the electronic side

201
00:16:11,280 --> 00:16:14,980
 of things, but even the pump side of things and motor side of things.

202
00:16:14,980 --> 00:16:19,840
 So we had to troubleshoot all of the things that were connected to the system.

203
00:16:19,840 --> 00:16:25,720
 So ultimately, I think at the end of the third day, we were able to fix the problem.

204
00:16:25,720 --> 00:16:30,680
 We were able to get the facilities back and running and the intake operation back.

205
00:16:30,680 --> 00:16:36,920
 So that was our main focus in stabilizing the plant operation and increasing the production

206
00:16:36,920 --> 00:16:39,400
 capacity to meet the demand.

207
00:16:39,400 --> 00:16:44,440
 Similarly, we had to change operation on the other side of things.

208
00:16:44,440 --> 00:16:52,840
 So storage, as I mentioned earlier, we constantly tracked every single tank and their levels.

209
00:16:52,840 --> 00:16:59,640
 We almost had an hourly checklist and chart going every single time.

210
00:16:59,640 --> 00:17:00,640
 What are the levels?

211
00:17:00,640 --> 00:17:01,640
 Are we rising?

212
00:17:01,640 --> 00:17:02,640
 Are we stable?

213
00:17:02,640 --> 00:17:03,640
 Are we declining?

214
00:17:03,640 --> 00:17:06,280
 So we had to really focus on keeping that.

215
00:17:06,280 --> 00:17:12,760
 One of the things that we did, we did remove one storage tank out of the system that helped

216
00:17:12,760 --> 00:17:18,840
 us add more, start filling up the other tanks fairly quickly.

217
00:17:18,840 --> 00:17:23,640
 As the Rosalong tank is a little bit at a higher elevation, it takes a lot longer to

218
00:17:23,640 --> 00:17:26,440
 get that tank and pressure build up to fill it.

219
00:17:26,440 --> 00:17:27,480
 So we took it offline.

220
00:17:27,480 --> 00:17:32,800
 We started filling all the other tanks and get them to a level where we're comfortable.

221
00:17:32,800 --> 00:17:38,640
 And then slowly we introduced the Rosalong tank back into the whole operation.

222
00:17:38,640 --> 00:17:42,720
 On the distribution side, as I mentioned, we had several leaks.

223
00:17:42,720 --> 00:17:48,700
 And in order to address these high number of leaks, we deployed wastewater crews.

224
00:17:48,700 --> 00:17:52,520
 There was minimal impact to our wastewater system.

225
00:17:52,520 --> 00:17:57,760
 So the collections, since these wastewater pipes are typically buried deep in the ground,

226
00:17:57,760 --> 00:18:02,480
 the water flowing through them is actually coming from homes, which are warmer water.

227
00:18:02,480 --> 00:18:05,220
 So we didn't have that much impact on the wastewater side.

228
00:18:05,220 --> 00:18:11,760
 So what we did, we were able to reassign the wastewater crews to go and help dig up the

229
00:18:11,760 --> 00:18:17,000
 trenches, help set up the equipment and help fix a large number of breaks.

230
00:18:17,000 --> 00:18:23,280
 So that was a really reassignment that staff really helped us address some of these breaks

231
00:18:23,280 --> 00:18:26,680
 very quickly and get things under control.

232
00:18:26,680 --> 00:18:34,680
 Similarly, on the metering side, we received a significant number of higher phone calls.

233
00:18:34,680 --> 00:18:41,720
 So customer service staff was able to jump in, set up, you know, makeshift areas to start

234
00:18:41,720 --> 00:18:47,640
 addressing and answer, I'm sorry, something's happening, oh, there we go, makeshift and

235
00:18:47,640 --> 00:18:50,280
 answer some of the questions.

236
00:18:50,280 --> 00:18:56,000
 And then also we had wastewater staff also jump in again and help the metering staff

237
00:18:56,000 --> 00:19:02,160
 go out and start turning the meters off, start helping with water leaks at the residential

238
00:19:02,160 --> 00:19:03,160
 service line.

239
00:19:03,160 --> 00:19:07,840
 So it was really helpful to reassign some of the staff, a lot of city staff jumped in

240
00:19:07,840 --> 00:19:12,920
 and we'll get to that, what really worked portion and Terry gets to talk about that

241
00:19:12,920 --> 00:19:17,320
 a little bit later in the presentation.

242
00:19:17,320 --> 00:19:20,240
 Wastewater departments, that was all about water.

243
00:19:20,240 --> 00:19:22,680
 Now we're moving to wastewater.

244
00:19:22,680 --> 00:19:30,360
 I want to start down here where majority of the issues were handled without a large incident.

245
00:19:30,360 --> 00:19:36,120
 There was not a whole lot of impact, although there were some minor issues.

246
00:19:36,120 --> 00:19:44,040
 As you can see, the wastewater treatment facility saw a increase in flow, which is about 40,

247
00:19:44,040 --> 00:19:49,840
 50% higher flow coming into the treatment facility.

248
00:19:49,840 --> 00:19:56,160
 There were some impacts from the weather, freezing of sludge lines and freezing of backwash

249
00:19:56,160 --> 00:19:59,700
 system at the ropes and ranch reclamation plant.

250
00:19:59,700 --> 00:20:05,940
 And then also freezing of some biodiesel fuel, it thickened and it impacted the generators

251
00:20:05,940 --> 00:20:09,200
 that we used in the lift station during the rolling outages.

252
00:20:09,200 --> 00:20:14,720
 So yes, there was some impact weather-wise as some of these lines started freezing up,

253
00:20:14,720 --> 00:20:21,000
 we were able to quickly get staff in and unfreeze them and get the operation back to normal.

254
00:20:21,000 --> 00:20:26,040
 And then the other thing, we did see a lot of collaboration, wastewater staff helping

255
00:20:26,040 --> 00:20:31,040
 water production address some of these staff issues, staffing issues, and also helping

256
00:20:31,040 --> 00:20:38,720
 them provide electrical, technical expertise in addressing some of their problems.

257
00:20:38,720 --> 00:20:45,040
 So all in all, wastewater department was less impacted, if you may, compared to the other

258
00:20:45,040 --> 00:20:47,360
 operation that we have.

259
00:20:47,360 --> 00:20:51,560
 And then quickly go over the public, I know there's a lot of information on this slide,

260
00:20:51,560 --> 00:20:55,680
 I don't want you to just focus on this particular table.

261
00:20:55,680 --> 00:20:59,800
 These are the, this is just a print of actual notifications that were sent out.

262
00:20:59,800 --> 00:21:06,680
 A quick timeline on what information and when it was sent out, I want to point out this

263
00:21:06,680 --> 00:21:14,980
 was 2/16, I think it was a Tuesday that we started noticing a considerable drop in storage

264
00:21:14,980 --> 00:21:20,560
 tank levels and immediately issued a water conservation notice.

265
00:21:20,560 --> 00:21:27,520
 And then we tracked the following day on Wednesday, we saw that the tank levels were improving

266
00:21:27,520 --> 00:21:33,240
 but still wanted to maintain that hey, we need to conserve water to get to a comfortable

267
00:21:33,240 --> 00:21:37,900
 position, so we continue to issue a conservation notice.

268
00:21:37,900 --> 00:21:42,360
 And then on Wednesday, unfortunately, our system wide pressure, there were quite a few

269
00:21:42,360 --> 00:21:50,760
 locations that the pressure within the pipe dropped below 20 pounds per square inch, consistent

270
00:21:50,760 --> 00:21:56,840
 with the TCEQ guidelines, we have to report it, we have to issue a boil notice and report

271
00:21:56,840 --> 00:22:06,520
 it to TCEQ, so staff had to follow that direction from the state agency from TCEQ, making sure

272
00:22:06,520 --> 00:22:13,240
 that everyone was notified that there was a pressure drop and finally boil water notice

273
00:22:13,240 --> 00:22:16,200
 was issued.

274
00:22:16,200 --> 00:22:21,480
 In the next couple days, we really focused on stabilizing the levels in the storage tank

275
00:22:21,480 --> 00:22:27,680
 for the water and then also worked on updating the boil water notice.

276
00:22:27,680 --> 00:22:35,160
 And then finally, Saturday morning, we were able to lift the boil water notice and cancel

277
00:22:35,160 --> 00:22:41,640
 that a little bit of steps in between is not only we have to stabilize, but we have to

278
00:22:41,640 --> 00:22:47,920
 conduct sampling and analysis, which typically takes about 12 to 18 hours.

279
00:22:47,920 --> 00:22:55,280
 So we started that, we set up the sampling collection on Friday, so the notice was issued

280
00:22:55,280 --> 00:22:59,600
 on Wednesday, we set up the collection on Friday where we felt, yes, we're at a point

281
00:22:59,600 --> 00:23:02,240
 where the system was back.

282
00:23:02,240 --> 00:23:08,720
 And we picked samples up by noon, we had all of them in the lab and started testing once

283
00:23:08,720 --> 00:23:11,200
 the test was complete.

284
00:23:11,200 --> 00:23:16,640
 On Friday, Saturday morning is when we got the results and immediately issued the cancellation.

285
00:23:16,640 --> 00:23:22,920
 So that was a little bit of timeline to understand what was going on on our side versus the outward

286
00:23:22,920 --> 00:23:27,040
 facing piece with the public and the notifications.

287
00:23:27,040 --> 00:23:32,040
 And then I want to turn to Terry for the last couple of slides.

288
00:23:32,040 --> 00:23:37,240
 He is online and he will be talking about the action items or the opportunities for

289
00:23:37,240 --> 00:23:41,280
 improvement and then the final slide, which is what worked.

290
00:23:41,280 --> 00:23:42,280
 Terry?

291
00:23:42,280 --> 00:23:47,280
 Yes, good morning, Council, POB members.

292
00:23:47,280 --> 00:23:53,760
 I'm going to go over these improvement opportunities and just briefly describe kind of the actions

293
00:23:53,760 --> 00:23:55,820
 that we're going to be taking.

294
00:23:55,820 --> 00:24:01,320
 And I'll just point out that during the storm, I was in a role acting as interim director

295
00:24:01,320 --> 00:24:04,880
 of water and wastewater.

296
00:24:04,880 --> 00:24:09,540
 And I want to thank the water and wastewater team for the job that they did, although we

297
00:24:09,540 --> 00:24:15,760
 never like to issue full water notices, we are required to do so under these conditions

298
00:24:15,760 --> 00:24:22,120
 and they worked very, very hard to get the system back into operating state as quickly

299
00:24:22,120 --> 00:24:23,980
 as possible.

300
00:24:23,980 --> 00:24:30,040
 So I'm going to give you all these improvement opportunities and then our new director of

301
00:24:30,040 --> 00:24:34,800
 water and wastewater, Stephen Gay, who's online here with me, is going to get the opportunity

302
00:24:34,800 --> 00:24:40,760
 to bring these back in front of you to the extent that they require either POB or council

303
00:24:40,760 --> 00:24:42,400
 approval.

304
00:24:42,400 --> 00:24:46,000
 So the first area we'll talk about is public communication.

305
00:24:46,000 --> 00:24:53,600
 I think there was a number of comments that we received that our messages were confusing.

306
00:24:53,600 --> 00:25:02,680
 At the same time that we're talking about people running their faucets to drip to keep

307
00:25:02,680 --> 00:25:07,600
 their lines from freezing up, we're also asking for water conservation measures.

308
00:25:07,600 --> 00:25:15,160
 And I think as Preetam has described, that was a necessary evil because our tank levels

309
00:25:15,160 --> 00:25:22,700
 were going down so quickly, we had to ask for those conservation measures.

310
00:25:22,700 --> 00:25:30,680
 So we're working on messaging and getting some predetermined messages that are approved

311
00:25:30,680 --> 00:25:38,240
 for these situations so that we can avoid the level of confusion.

312
00:25:38,240 --> 00:25:43,080
 We've reviewed our SOPs, our standard operating procedures and our emergency plans to make

313
00:25:43,080 --> 00:25:51,360
 sure that we're fully compliant with TCEQ requirements and that we have the right contacts

314
00:25:51,360 --> 00:25:56,660
 in place both within the city and within the media outlets.

315
00:25:56,660 --> 00:26:04,080
 And then social media response, you know, most of our communication these days is through

316
00:26:04,080 --> 00:26:05,600
 social media.

317
00:26:05,600 --> 00:26:10,600
 That's the most rapid way that we can get messaging out to our customers.

318
00:26:10,600 --> 00:26:17,960
 And so we are looking at social media policy issues.

319
00:26:17,960 --> 00:26:24,320
 One of the issues is we don't normally respond to social media posts.

320
00:26:24,320 --> 00:26:29,320
 And we were seeing some posts that potentially exacerbated the problem.

321
00:26:29,320 --> 00:26:35,200
 We had a number of posts where citizens were saying that, hey, there's a main break at

322
00:26:35,200 --> 00:26:42,080
 this location, fill your bathtub with water so that you don't run out of water.

323
00:26:42,080 --> 00:26:46,320
 And we were not able to respond to those postings.

324
00:26:46,320 --> 00:26:53,800
 And we need to look at that to make sure in those situations we have the proper response.

325
00:26:53,800 --> 00:26:56,640
 We've heard a lot of talk about weatherization.

326
00:26:56,640 --> 00:27:02,400
 And clearly we've got to invest some money in weatherization.

327
00:27:02,400 --> 00:27:09,280
 The Ray Roberts chlorine system we will include as part of a project that we have going on,

328
00:27:09,280 --> 00:27:14,560
 the Ray Roberts regulatory upgrade, which is a large capital project, $30 million plus

329
00:27:14,560 --> 00:27:16,740
 project that we have going on.

330
00:27:16,740 --> 00:27:19,040
 We're doing the design work now.

331
00:27:19,040 --> 00:27:25,560
 We will integrate those weatherization issues into that design.

332
00:27:25,560 --> 00:27:31,460
 Tank levels, the chart that Preetam showed just showed that we lost tank signals.

333
00:27:31,460 --> 00:27:33,720
 We couldn't tell how much water was in our tanks.

334
00:27:33,720 --> 00:27:35,340
 And that's never a good situation.

335
00:27:35,340 --> 00:27:40,120
 So we're going to have to look at how to upgrade those to make sure we always have constant

336
00:27:40,120 --> 00:27:43,820
 surveillance of our water levels.

337
00:27:43,820 --> 00:27:48,360
 We did have the wastewater sludge line freeze up at Pecan Creek.

338
00:27:48,360 --> 00:27:54,200
 We're also doing a solid handling project, which we're doing the design work on that

339
00:27:54,200 --> 00:27:59,760
 now and we'll integrate into that design some weatherization.

340
00:27:59,760 --> 00:28:08,160
 The Robeson Ranch backwash issue, we are decommissioning the Robeson Ranch wastewater treatment plant

341
00:28:08,160 --> 00:28:13,680
 in 2022 and be diverting that wastewater to Pecan Creek.

342
00:28:13,680 --> 00:28:17,400
 And so that one's kind of a self-healing.

343
00:28:17,400 --> 00:28:20,940
 We're going to be taking care of that without any additional investments.

344
00:28:20,940 --> 00:28:24,760
 And then flushing truck bay.

345
00:28:24,760 --> 00:28:29,720
 When we see this severe weather coming in, we're going to have to take some additional

346
00:28:29,720 --> 00:28:35,160
 measures to get our critical equipment into heated areas so that we can ensure that they're

347
00:28:35,160 --> 00:28:37,880
 going to be able to start up.

348
00:28:37,880 --> 00:28:45,040
 On the power supply side, Ray Roberts, the backup generators were not operating at the

349
00:28:45,040 --> 00:28:48,480
 level or reliability that we would like them to.

350
00:28:48,480 --> 00:28:49,600
 We're going to have to look at that.

351
00:28:49,600 --> 00:28:55,140
 And again, that'll be part of that regulatory upgrade scope of work.

352
00:28:55,140 --> 00:29:00,560
 We have been in contact with the electric provider, which is CoServe.

353
00:29:00,560 --> 00:29:07,880
 And as you're aware, there's a statewide effort going on to identify all the critical facilities.

354
00:29:07,880 --> 00:29:13,380
 And we've added this facility to the list and hopefully that will resolve our issue.

355
00:29:13,380 --> 00:29:22,320
 We still need backup generation there in the event that we would lose that power feed.

356
00:29:22,320 --> 00:29:27,240
 The intake pumps, we've resolved that issue as a switch problem on the DME circuit.

357
00:29:27,240 --> 00:29:33,320
 And we feel comfortably that we've resolved that with no additional efforts.

358
00:29:33,320 --> 00:29:41,360
 The boil water advisory, I just want to make sure everybody's clear on this.

359
00:29:41,360 --> 00:29:47,520
 We were forced to make the boil water advisory because our pressure dropped below 20 PSI.

360
00:29:47,520 --> 00:29:53,860
 At no time did we have concerns that contaminated water had been pulled into our water system.

361
00:29:53,860 --> 00:29:59,720
 This was a regulatory requirement due to that high demand and our inability to produce water

362
00:29:59,720 --> 00:30:03,020
 in sufficient quantities to meet that demand.

363
00:30:03,020 --> 00:30:11,480
 And so that conflicting information, again, what happened was once we lifted the boil

364
00:30:11,480 --> 00:30:19,240
 water advisory, we saw posts on social media telling residents to run their water for 10

365
00:30:19,240 --> 00:30:26,160
 minutes before they could consume it and to flush out their ice machines to make sure

366
00:30:26,160 --> 00:30:34,360
 that the ice that potentially was made with contaminated water was fully flushed out of

367
00:30:34,360 --> 00:30:36,160
 the system.

368
00:30:36,160 --> 00:30:43,720
 And in a normal water main break situation where we lose pressure and we have an open

369
00:30:43,720 --> 00:30:50,880
 pipe that could potentially pull in water from an excavation, contaminated water, that

370
00:30:50,880 --> 00:30:52,080
 would be an issue.

371
00:30:52,080 --> 00:30:58,560
 But in this case, since we never had an opening to contaminated water, that was not a concern

372
00:30:58,560 --> 00:30:59,560
 that we had.

373
00:30:59,560 --> 00:31:01,560
 And we need to do a better job of communicating that.

374
00:31:01,560 --> 00:31:08,840
 So we'll be working on communication protocols to ensure that that's clear.

375
00:31:08,840 --> 00:31:15,920
 And then one thing that we didn't anticipate, which was having no power to boil water with.

376
00:31:15,920 --> 00:31:21,680
 So when you don't have any power to be able to run your electric stove to boil water with,

377
00:31:21,680 --> 00:31:25,720
 that's a situation that we had not contemplated.

378
00:31:25,720 --> 00:31:32,360
 And so we're considering what our inventory level should be for bottled water and in-house

379
00:31:32,360 --> 00:31:35,240
 capabilities for production.

380
00:31:35,240 --> 00:31:43,280
 Some other issues that came up because the inability of transportation systems became

381
00:31:43,280 --> 00:31:53,520
 precipitously low on certain chemical inventories and we have revised our processes, our standard

382
00:31:53,520 --> 00:31:58,640
 operating procedures now to look at those chemical inventory levels at our production

383
00:31:58,640 --> 00:32:07,940
 facilities in anticipation of the winter months coming on a potential repeat.

384
00:32:07,940 --> 00:32:13,240
 One of your new director of water, wastewater strengths is emergency planning and he'll

385
00:32:13,240 --> 00:32:19,880
 be looking at all of our emergency planning and processes and incident command integration

386
00:32:19,880 --> 00:32:25,440
 to make sure that they are best in class.

387
00:32:25,440 --> 00:32:31,760
 Preetam mentioned the staffing issue that we ran into, which was our instrument and

388
00:32:31,760 --> 00:32:35,220
 controls and electricians personnel.

389
00:32:35,220 --> 00:32:40,200
 We found out through this process that we didn't have enough.

390
00:32:40,200 --> 00:32:41,980
 We have limited staff in that area.

391
00:32:41,980 --> 00:32:51,640
 We actually had to borrow staff from DME both from the line crews and from the deck to help

392
00:32:51,640 --> 00:32:57,880
 troubleshoot some issues and to provide a level of staffing necessary to meet the demands.

393
00:32:57,880 --> 00:33:01,700
 So that's something that as we go through the budget for next year, we'll be looking

394
00:33:01,700 --> 00:33:09,520
 at getting rid of that risk if we can.

395
00:33:09,520 --> 00:33:20,440
 The number of pipe breaks in homes and the need for us to come out and turn off the meter,

396
00:33:20,440 --> 00:33:25,920
 turn off the water to the home at the street was hampered by the fact that we were sending

397
00:33:25,920 --> 00:33:35,920
 crews out and there was still ice and materials that were overtop of the meter boxes and where

398
00:33:35,920 --> 00:33:42,280
 the valves were, it took a long time to locate a number of these shutoffs.

399
00:33:42,280 --> 00:33:47,820
 And so we'll be looking at geolocating each of those so that someone can go out with an

400
00:33:47,820 --> 00:33:55,960
 instrument and know precisely where that valve should be located on these homes and businesses.

401
00:33:55,960 --> 00:34:04,760
 And then finally, the diesel fuel, this was an issue across all of our utilities.

402
00:34:04,760 --> 00:34:10,720
 When the temperature got down and below zero, that diesel fuel gelled and we couldn't get

403
00:34:10,720 --> 00:34:13,480
 generators or trucks started.

404
00:34:13,480 --> 00:34:19,880
 And we're working with Fleet to see if we can't provide some additives that will abate

405
00:34:19,880 --> 00:34:21,320
 that problem in the future.

406
00:34:21,320 --> 00:34:24,520
 Go to the next slide if you would, pre-Tim.

407
00:34:24,520 --> 00:34:26,640
 So what did work?

408
00:34:26,640 --> 00:34:31,360
 Our staff did a stellar job.

409
00:34:31,360 --> 00:34:33,560
 Everybody pulled together.

410
00:34:33,560 --> 00:34:41,800
 Like I said, we used people from DME, we used people from Fleet to transport chemicals from

411
00:34:41,800 --> 00:34:44,360
 Louisville to Ray Roberts.

412
00:34:44,360 --> 00:34:48,120
 It was just an amazing show of teamwork.

413
00:34:48,120 --> 00:34:57,440
 Our lab provides laboratory results or laboratory analysis with just unbelievable quick turnaround

414
00:34:57,440 --> 00:34:58,440
 times.

415
00:34:58,440 --> 00:35:02,260
 Having that capability in-house saved us countless hours.

416
00:35:02,260 --> 00:35:08,400
 And by the way, they do that service for other municipalities as well.

417
00:35:08,400 --> 00:35:11,680
 And they don't get the praise that they deserve.

418
00:35:11,680 --> 00:35:17,920
 They do a super job at the lab and they're a very valuable asset to the city.

419
00:35:17,920 --> 00:35:18,920
 Strong leadership.

420
00:35:18,920 --> 00:35:24,560
 I mean, the city manager's office was, we were on the phone four times a day, every

421
00:35:24,560 --> 00:35:33,480
 day for the entire duration of the storm from really from Saturday the 13th all the way

422
00:35:33,480 --> 00:35:38,800
 through Saturday the 20th until the incidents were over.

423
00:35:38,800 --> 00:35:44,440
 And the city manager's office provided us with the support we needed.

424
00:35:44,440 --> 00:35:51,040
 We even had folks from HR that were bringing food out to our employees that had been working

425
00:35:51,040 --> 00:35:54,120
 24 hours or more.

426
00:35:54,120 --> 00:35:57,320
 Just really appreciated all that support.

427
00:35:57,320 --> 00:36:03,760
 And the constant clear lines of communication with city staff were critical, as well as

428
00:36:03,760 --> 00:36:08,400
 trying to do the best we possibly could with residents to keep them up to speed on what

429
00:36:08,400 --> 00:36:16,760
 was happening so that they understood when water was expected to come back.

430
00:36:16,760 --> 00:36:18,640
 And we actually beat our estimate.

431
00:36:18,640 --> 00:36:24,920
 We anticipated that it would be early Sunday morning for releasing the boil water advisor.

432
00:36:24,920 --> 00:36:29,320
 We were able to actually get it released mid-morning on Saturday.

433
00:36:29,320 --> 00:36:34,120
 So with that, Preetam, if you'll take it down, we can answer any questions.

434
00:36:34,120 --> 00:36:40,600
 Give me a second.

435
00:36:40,600 --> 00:36:47,520
 There we go.

436
00:36:47,520 --> 00:36:50,120
 Okay, questions?

437
00:36:50,120 --> 00:36:52,160
 Mr. Jumper, I think I saw you first.

438
00:36:52,160 --> 00:36:54,120
 Yeah, thanks, guys.

439
00:36:54,120 --> 00:36:56,840
 I have two questions, if I may.

440
00:36:56,840 --> 00:37:03,800
 You mentioned storage capacity got down around 10 to 15%, I believe.

441
00:37:03,800 --> 00:37:07,500
 So I was curious, I didn't catch this if you said it.

442
00:37:07,500 --> 00:37:09,400
 What is an acceptable minimum?

443
00:37:09,400 --> 00:37:10,400
 What's dangerous?

444
00:37:10,400 --> 00:37:13,480
 Like, what does that level mean for us?

445
00:37:13,480 --> 00:37:21,040
 Yeah, I would say anything lower than 20% is a danger zone that we need to be very concerned

446
00:37:21,040 --> 00:37:22,040
 about.

447
00:37:22,040 --> 00:37:24,480
 And the issue there is really a public safety issue.

448
00:37:24,480 --> 00:37:30,600
 To the extent that we had a major fire in the city, we'd have a hard time recovering

449
00:37:30,600 --> 00:37:32,520
 our tank levels.

450
00:37:32,520 --> 00:37:34,560
 Okay.

451
00:37:34,560 --> 00:37:44,280
 And then secondly, I have to ask, has anybody looked into the implications of the do not

452
00:37:44,280 --> 00:37:46,320
 drip notice?

453
00:37:46,320 --> 00:37:51,480
 Telling people not to drip in their lines, did that in fact cause more line breaks?

454
00:37:51,480 --> 00:37:53,680
 Has anybody looked at anything like that?

455
00:37:53,680 --> 00:37:56,240
 Do we know anything?

456
00:37:56,240 --> 00:37:58,760
 We've not done any investigations on that.

457
00:37:58,760 --> 00:38:08,560
 I think line breaks are really more a result of shifting ground from freezing and thawing

458
00:38:08,560 --> 00:38:13,800
 and the temperature of the water in the lines.

459
00:38:13,800 --> 00:38:19,900
 We're pulling water out of the lake and as the lake gets colder, that temperature differentiation

460
00:38:19,900 --> 00:38:24,680
 between the water and the pipe, the steel and the surrounding ground causes an expansion

461
00:38:24,680 --> 00:38:31,000
 issue and that's really what leads to most of the breaks that we see during really cold

462
00:38:31,000 --> 00:38:32,000
 weather periods.

463
00:38:32,000 --> 00:38:38,920
 Are you talking in the mains in the main system or in individual houses?

464
00:38:38,920 --> 00:38:44,400
 I was speaking of water mains and distribution lines, yeah.

465
00:38:44,400 --> 00:38:50,720
 As far as homes go, you know, the theory is if you keep water running through your pipes,

466
00:38:50,720 --> 00:38:56,160
 then the ice will not have time to build up and expand and crack your pipe.

467
00:38:56,160 --> 00:39:01,920
 So if you keep water running through there, you should not seem to have that problem.

468
00:39:01,920 --> 00:39:06,880
 You know, our issue here was that while we wanted to help homeowners to protect their

469
00:39:06,880 --> 00:39:15,920
 personal property, we had to worry about public safety and that's why we were asking for conservation

470
00:39:15,920 --> 00:39:22,240
 notices at the same time they were hearing that you need to keep your lines dripping

471
00:39:22,240 --> 00:39:25,680
 in order to keep them from freezing up.

472
00:39:25,680 --> 00:39:29,080
 Mr. Sof?

473
00:39:29,080 --> 00:39:32,680
 Yes, thank you.

474
00:39:32,680 --> 00:39:41,200
 I had some questions about the 16 water main breaks.

475
00:39:41,200 --> 00:39:48,240
 Were these caused by freezing water or by ground shifts or both?

476
00:39:48,240 --> 00:39:50,080
 I think it was all of the above.

477
00:39:50,080 --> 00:39:56,320
 There were several things that played into that, not only the temperature and the differential,

478
00:39:56,320 --> 00:40:02,560
 but also the pipe material, the age of the pipes and where they were located.

479
00:40:02,560 --> 00:40:05,040
 I think it was all of the above.

480
00:40:05,040 --> 00:40:10,080
 Okay, you sort of answered my other questions because I was curious if there was a consensus

481
00:40:10,080 --> 00:40:14,960
 of older pipes, newer pipes, iron PVC?

482
00:40:14,960 --> 00:40:15,960
 Correct.

483
00:40:15,960 --> 00:40:16,960
 Yeah.

484
00:40:16,960 --> 00:40:19,240
 It included all pipe material.

485
00:40:19,240 --> 00:40:20,680
 There are some of the larger pipes.

486
00:40:20,680 --> 00:40:23,000
 There were ductile iron.

487
00:40:23,000 --> 00:40:24,000
 They had breaks as well.

488
00:40:24,000 --> 00:40:29,960
 It was not just the particular type of material that was impacted.

489
00:40:29,960 --> 00:40:31,960
 Okay.

490
00:40:31,960 --> 00:40:35,120
 Were these mains above ground or below ground?

491
00:40:35,120 --> 00:40:36,120
 Below ground.

492
00:40:36,120 --> 00:40:39,160
 The majority of these mains have to be dug out.

493
00:40:39,160 --> 00:40:44,120
 Do you know how many customers were affected by those 16 breaks?

494
00:40:44,120 --> 00:40:49,120
 I don't have that direct number on top of my head, but there were several main breaks

495
00:40:49,120 --> 00:40:53,680
 that we were able to isolate without impacting the customers.

496
00:40:53,680 --> 00:40:59,360
 We did put some of these pieces of pipe in isolation and diverted around them because

497
00:40:59,360 --> 00:41:03,080
 we have a loop system in the majority of the city.

498
00:41:03,080 --> 00:41:09,080
 Going back to something that Terry said about water flow reducing ice formation, does that

499
00:41:09,080 --> 00:41:13,280
 have any bearing on water mains too?

500
00:41:13,280 --> 00:41:17,120
 I would assume that there's water flowing through those all the time.

501
00:41:17,120 --> 00:41:18,120
 Correct.

502
00:41:18,120 --> 00:41:23,960
 Then the other piece to that is how deep they're buried because there is a certain level that

503
00:41:23,960 --> 00:41:29,720
 the freezing reaches to and depending on the timeline that how long the freezing is actually

504
00:41:29,720 --> 00:41:36,000
 happening, if the pipe is buried fairly deep, it doesn't hit those pipes as far as the temperature

505
00:41:36,000 --> 00:41:37,000
 is concerned.

506
00:41:37,000 --> 00:41:46,920
 I guess the big question is, and I didn't see it mentioned in the action items and improvement

507
00:41:46,920 --> 00:41:52,920
 opportunities, is how do you weatherize water mains?

508
00:41:52,920 --> 00:41:56,280
 Do you dig them up and make them deeper or what?

509
00:41:56,280 --> 00:41:59,480
 It seems like a real conundrum.

510
00:41:59,480 --> 00:42:04,360
 It is a challenge and Terry can jump in a little bit, but it is a challenge.

511
00:42:04,360 --> 00:42:10,080
 Obviously, there are freezing lines defined in several regions throughout the US where

512
00:42:10,080 --> 00:42:11,840
 there are cold temperatures.

513
00:42:11,840 --> 00:42:17,480
 If you go to a place like Chicago, the freezing lines are under three.

514
00:42:17,480 --> 00:42:21,040
 Everything has to be three to four feet below ground because that's where the freezing lines

515
00:42:21,040 --> 00:42:22,240
 hit.

516
00:42:22,240 --> 00:42:27,680
 For areas where we are at, it's about six inches currently, but when you hit something

517
00:42:27,680 --> 00:42:32,880
 like this, which is unexpected and stays for more than three to four days, those lines

518
00:42:32,880 --> 00:42:35,280
 typically dip down further in.

519
00:42:35,280 --> 00:42:42,440
 As a utility, does it make sense to lower all the lines for one event?

520
00:42:42,440 --> 00:42:50,320
 That's a difficult question to answer and it doesn't financially make sense at this

521
00:42:50,320 --> 00:42:53,840
 point, but Terry can add to that.

522
00:42:53,840 --> 00:42:54,840
 Thank you very much.

523
00:42:54,840 --> 00:43:04,480
 I don't have anything to add except that really it's just the nature of the beast.

524
00:43:04,480 --> 00:43:11,160
 We have development codes that require lines to be placed at a certain depth, below a certain

525
00:43:11,160 --> 00:43:16,640
 depth, and that's in order to provide that level of freeze protection as well.

526
00:43:16,640 --> 00:43:23,280
 Anecdotally, for a groundwater system where you're pumping water out of the ground at

527
00:43:23,280 --> 00:43:29,960
 a constant temperature year round, you don't typically have a lot of main breaks.

528
00:43:29,960 --> 00:43:35,600
 Most of the main breaks are due to this big swing in temperature of the water inside the

529
00:43:35,600 --> 00:43:36,600
 pipe.

530
00:43:36,600 --> 00:43:42,880
 If you think about it, you got very cold water in a pipe surrounded by soil that's a relatively

531
00:43:42,880 --> 00:43:49,200
 stable temperature and that contraction because of that cold water in the pipe causes stresses

532
00:43:49,200 --> 00:43:53,920
 on the piping system that you don't normally see and that's what causes a lot of the main

533
00:43:53,920 --> 00:43:54,920
 breaks.

534
00:43:54,920 --> 00:43:57,400
 If I may, one more question.

535
00:43:57,400 --> 00:43:59,400
 Go ahead.

536
00:43:59,400 --> 00:44:06,440
 You have figures on how many or if there were any water main breaks in 2011 when that weather

537
00:44:06,440 --> 00:44:08,080
 event occurred.

538
00:44:08,080 --> 00:44:11,920
 Yes, we can pull that information if we have that available.

539
00:44:11,920 --> 00:44:12,920
 Absolutely.

540
00:44:12,920 --> 00:44:15,680
 I'd really like to see that.

541
00:44:15,680 --> 00:44:16,680
 Thank you very much.

542
00:44:16,680 --> 00:44:20,280
 Thank you, Mr. Sof, Mr. Rybak.

543
00:44:20,280 --> 00:44:22,440
 Yes, thank you.

544
00:44:22,440 --> 00:44:23,440
 I was curious.

545
00:44:23,440 --> 00:44:28,200
 I think it was Terry earlier mentioned PCQ.

546
00:44:28,200 --> 00:44:31,680
 I'm just don't know what that is so I'd like to ask.

547
00:44:31,680 --> 00:44:41,880
 Yes, T-C-T is in Terry, T-C-E-Q, that's the Texas Environmental, Texas, help me out guys.

548
00:44:41,880 --> 00:44:44,880
 Texas Commission on Environmental Quality.

549
00:44:44,880 --> 00:44:45,880
 Oh, T-C-E-Q.

550
00:44:45,880 --> 00:44:46,880
 Okay.

551
00:44:46,880 --> 00:44:53,880
 So, it's the regulatory agency that issues the permits for our water treatment system

552
00:44:53,880 --> 00:44:58,320
 and regulates drinking water throughout the state.

553
00:44:58,320 --> 00:44:59,560
 Okay, thank you.

554
00:44:59,560 --> 00:45:08,280
 The other thing you guys had mentioned, weatherizing fuel lines for the generators, does that weatherization

555
00:45:08,280 --> 00:45:14,680
 mean just insulation or are you looking at heat trace on the lines, tanks above ground,

556
00:45:14,680 --> 00:45:18,640
 belly tanks on the generators, can you tell us a little more about that?

557
00:45:18,640 --> 00:45:20,920
 Go ahead, Terry.

558
00:45:20,920 --> 00:45:28,400
 Yeah, so we'll have to study that and it'll be specific to each of the sites.

559
00:45:28,400 --> 00:45:34,960
 You know, theoretically if we can list all of our water production facilities, our booster

560
00:45:34,960 --> 00:45:40,400
 pump stations and tanks as critical facilities and they're on circuits that we don't lose

561
00:45:40,400 --> 00:45:45,320
 electric on, should this happen again, the level of weatherization probably will be less

562
00:45:45,320 --> 00:45:50,920
 than if they have to be operated as a remote standalone operation, so each facility we

563
00:45:50,920 --> 00:45:52,440
 looked at individually.

564
00:45:52,440 --> 00:45:58,320
 Yeah, so I was a little surprised to find that your water facilities were not on the

565
00:45:58,320 --> 00:46:03,800
 critical facility list, I must have been kind of a surprise to you guys too.

566
00:46:03,800 --> 00:46:07,840
 Unfortunately it was, yes.

567
00:46:07,840 --> 00:46:10,080
 Thank you.

568
00:46:10,080 --> 00:46:11,080
 Thank you Mr. Ibeck.

569
00:46:11,080 --> 00:46:12,080
 Council member Armentor.

570
00:46:12,080 --> 00:46:16,720
 Yes, I have three questions.

571
00:46:16,720 --> 00:46:20,440
 The first one is about communication with the fire department.

572
00:46:20,440 --> 00:46:29,920
 I was curious, you know, what, if any communication there was either way between the, from the

573
00:46:29,920 --> 00:46:39,000
 water department to the fire department or vice versa about the, you know, the kind of

574
00:46:39,000 --> 00:46:48,280
 push and pull between the, you know, do not drip your faucets and the, you know, fire

575
00:46:48,280 --> 00:46:53,160
 department responding to so many line breaks.

576
00:46:53,160 --> 00:47:01,280
 Interestingly both departments, it seems the demand was up about 700% roughly.

577
00:47:01,280 --> 00:47:05,120
 So you know, based on what you mentioned.

578
00:47:05,120 --> 00:47:11,560
 Yeah, so we, so council member Armentor, we always let the fire department know anytime

579
00:47:11,560 --> 00:47:19,800
 that we have a tank, a level issue or a pressure issue is specifically so that they know if

580
00:47:19,800 --> 00:47:25,400
 they're responding to a fire incident in part of the city that has a low pressure area,

581
00:47:25,400 --> 00:47:30,120
 they know to be prepared for that by bringing tank trucks, etc.

582
00:47:30,120 --> 00:47:37,280
 So we were also in communication with them, as I mentioned, four times a day as part of

583
00:47:37,280 --> 00:47:43,600
 our, our daily communication with the city manager's office, fire department participated

584
00:47:43,600 --> 00:47:44,600
 in that.

585
00:47:44,600 --> 00:47:51,400
 So we were able to keep them up to speed on what measures we were taking.

586
00:47:51,400 --> 00:47:52,400
 Thank you.

587
00:47:52,400 --> 00:47:59,160
 And my next question is about requests for shutoffs and it's kind of divided into two

588
00:47:59,160 --> 00:48:05,320
 parts and you can handle it however you want, businesses and apartments.

589
00:48:05,320 --> 00:48:13,480
 So did you, were you aware of, you know, and this could be for pre tam or Terry or both,

590
00:48:13,480 --> 00:48:21,920
 you know, aware of businesses that were not operational because of the, the, because the

591
00:48:21,920 --> 00:48:29,840
 freeze shut down pretty much everything, almost everything, that did not request to have their

592
00:48:29,840 --> 00:48:40,440
 water shut off that maybe could have both, you know, benefited those, those businesses

593
00:48:40,440 --> 00:48:49,040
 and the community from both a conservation and infrastructure point of view if they had,

594
00:48:49,040 --> 00:48:55,240
 you know, there had maybe been a, you know, some sort of communication to them that, you

595
00:48:55,240 --> 00:48:59,720
 know, you might want to shut your water off or you have to shut your water off.

596
00:48:59,720 --> 00:49:12,640
 And then as far as apartments go, you know, what, what is your sense of the degree of

597
00:49:12,640 --> 00:49:21,000
 management owners who requested to have their water shut off out of concern for, you know,

598
00:49:21,000 --> 00:49:30,360
 pipe damage that ended up leaving their water off for a long time, either out of concern

599
00:49:30,360 --> 00:49:38,280
 about what could happen or out of legitimate, you know, insufficient, you know, improperly

600
00:49:38,280 --> 00:49:44,040
 weatherized pipes. So if you could speak to both, I don't expect that you have concrete

601
00:49:44,040 --> 00:49:49,320
 data on all this because you're responding to whoever's in touch with you, but just anecdotally

602
00:49:49,320 --> 00:49:56,200
 kind of your sense of shutoffs for both businesses and apartments.

603
00:49:56,200 --> 00:50:02,200
 I can start with addressing the apartment piece. I think apartments typically have on-site

604
00:50:02,200 --> 00:50:08,960
 facility maintenance folks that are aware of where these valves are, where these shutoff

605
00:50:08,960 --> 00:50:16,240
 points are, and that's what they typically use. So we don't believe that there were

606
00:50:16,240 --> 00:50:22,840
 any significant calls, and I can find the exact numbers exactly of how many apartments

607
00:50:22,840 --> 00:50:28,560
 reached out to us, but they have the ability to send that person out there and take care

608
00:50:28,560 --> 00:50:35,480
 of some of the issues that they are experiencing on site. As far as businesses that were closed,

609
00:50:35,480 --> 00:50:44,640
 and a lot of them were, if we did receive calls from, you know, residents or businesses

610
00:50:44,640 --> 00:50:52,480
 nearby, then absolutely we addressed the concerns, but we did not actually reach out or attempt

611
00:50:52,480 --> 00:51:02,240
 to address some of these extra calls or extra turnoffs at the time, just given the amount

612
00:51:02,240 --> 00:51:09,480
 of calls that we're receiving from active residents to proactively engage more folks

613
00:51:09,480 --> 00:51:16,640
 and do that kind of stuff. But I'll let Terry if he has anything to add to that.

614
00:51:16,640 --> 00:51:19,640
 I don't.

615
00:51:19,640 --> 00:51:23,980
 Thank you for answering that. That makes a lot of sense. You all are so busy, you're

616
00:51:23,980 --> 00:51:31,280
 not going to be calling all the different businesses. I would hope that moving forward,

617
00:51:31,280 --> 00:51:37,040
 those of us who have lived through this, business owners, property owners, renters, whoever,

618
00:51:37,040 --> 00:51:42,160
 have a better sense of, okay, if this happens again or when this happens again, I'll make

619
00:51:42,160 --> 00:51:50,080
 sure to shut off the water to my business before locking up the shop or whatever. And

620
00:51:50,080 --> 00:51:57,960
 maybe with that 2020 hindsight, notice to business, and forgive me if this was already

621
00:51:57,960 --> 00:52:08,520
 done, but notice to businesses, just a general notice on social media and whatnot, an emergency

622
00:52:08,520 --> 00:52:16,560
 alert saying businesses, if you are shut down, please turn off your water. That probably

623
00:52:16,560 --> 00:52:26,480
 happened already. But anyway, my final question is about mobile homes that depend on well

624
00:52:26,480 --> 00:52:34,880
 water. And because of that, it's not a question about our water utility, our public water

625
00:52:34,880 --> 00:52:45,280
 utility, but it is a question about public water need. And so I was just wondering if

626
00:52:45,280 --> 00:52:53,200
 anything that you have heard anecdotally about mobile home communities that are dependent

627
00:52:53,200 --> 00:53:04,880
 on well water, who are not able to get back to normal as quickly as people who were on

628
00:53:04,880 --> 00:53:19,800
 city water. Yeah. We don't have any knowledge about mobile home renters or owners that aren't

629
00:53:19,800 --> 00:53:25,840
 on our system. We wouldn't have any access to that information.

630
00:53:25,840 --> 00:53:32,300
 And thank you. And I realize you don't have the access to that. I know that anecdotally

631
00:53:32,300 --> 00:53:38,480
 I've heard and heard about, and I thought maybe y'all had to, about some communities

632
00:53:38,480 --> 00:53:46,440
 who struggled for extra long because they didn't have this great resource that we're

633
00:53:46,440 --> 00:53:52,440
 all talking about. So just something for all of us decision makers to think about moving

634
00:53:52,440 --> 00:54:01,200
 forward as far as public water need. Okay. Other questions? I will make a quick

635
00:54:01,200 --> 00:54:07,560
 programming note. The city council has a scheduled quote unquote luncheon meeting at noon. That'll

636
00:54:07,560 --> 00:54:13,400
 be a different web link. Anybody who's watching along with this one and wants to see that

637
00:54:13,400 --> 00:54:17,400
 meeting as well, that'll be a different web link and it'll be after the conclusion of

638
00:54:17,400 --> 00:54:22,800
 this meeting in a short break. Council member Ryan, I think I saw your hand first.

639
00:54:22,800 --> 00:54:29,720
 Thank you. I got just a couple of quick questions. One is, this is similar to what I was asking

640
00:54:29,720 --> 00:54:37,360
 on the antifreeze at the power plant last week. On the chlorine, is there a way that

641
00:54:37,360 --> 00:54:43,960
 if we had it at a stronger solution than what we currently have? Because I know chlorine

642
00:54:43,960 --> 00:54:49,320
 has a very low freeze point. I mean, I think it's 150 below that pure chlorine freezes

643
00:54:49,320 --> 00:54:53,640
 that. Is that something that we're looking at to make it or is that a regulatory that

644
00:54:53,640 --> 00:54:57,000
 you're only allowed to use a certain strength and that's the strength that we had and that's

645
00:54:57,000 --> 00:55:00,760
 what froze? I think I can start the answer, Terry, and

646
00:55:00,760 --> 00:55:08,800
 what are the issues on the chlorine line was there was a valve that actually opens and

647
00:55:08,800 --> 00:55:14,800
 connects to the water that is sitting in the tank and that valve kind of back leaked into

648
00:55:14,800 --> 00:55:19,640
 the whole line, which froze the line. It's not necessarily the actual gas or liquid gas

649
00:55:19,640 --> 00:55:26,800
 got frozen up. It was more of that malfunction of the active valve and if that ever happens

650
00:55:26,800 --> 00:55:32,200
 again, yes, we're running into the same issue, but we're working on is coming up with a solution

651
00:55:32,200 --> 00:55:38,680
 that doesn't happen and we address that. Okay. And then my other question is regarding

652
00:55:38,680 --> 00:55:45,160
 meter keys because I know a lot of the local supply houses or big box stores, let's put

653
00:55:45,160 --> 00:55:53,440
 it that way, sell meter keys that don't work on city meter boxes. As we go forward, does

654
00:55:53,440 --> 00:55:59,840
 the city supply those or is that something that the developer would put in as they build

655
00:55:59,840 --> 00:56:04,860
 out an area? Yeah, I don't have an answer if we supply

656
00:56:04,860 --> 00:56:10,120
 it, but we can definitely get back to you as to how we can address this issue.

657
00:56:10,120 --> 00:56:14,080
 Yeah. I'm just thinking the next time, if the city supplies them, the next time we go

658
00:56:14,080 --> 00:56:18,880
 to order them to see if there's some that work with a little bit more wide range of

659
00:56:18,880 --> 00:56:24,960
 key varieties, because I know I have the neighbor across the street had borrowed a key from

660
00:56:24,960 --> 00:56:29,520
 another neighbor and spent, he was out there for 10 minutes, then another neighbor came

661
00:56:29,520 --> 00:56:33,960
 out and they worked on it for another 15 minutes. I've got one that works. I walked over there

662
00:56:33,960 --> 00:56:40,200
 and twisted and it was up. So if you're trying to shut off that water in a hurry, that makes

663
00:56:40,200 --> 00:56:49,720
 a huge difference. Absolutely. Board member Divini, did I see your hand

664
00:56:49,720 --> 00:56:55,340
 a little while ago? Yeah, I just had a sort of rookie question

665
00:56:55,340 --> 00:57:03,040
 about what difference summer demand would make. Obviously, there was a question because

666
00:57:03,040 --> 00:57:09,600
 demand went up, but the demand would not have been as high as it is on a typical day in

667
00:57:09,600 --> 00:57:15,960
 the summer. So I was wondering just how important water demand was considering that we have

668
00:57:15,960 --> 00:57:20,840
 times of the year when demand is much, much higher than the winter demand.

669
00:57:20,840 --> 00:57:30,640
 Yes. Great question. So we do have seasonal maintenance activities that we're performing

670
00:57:30,640 --> 00:57:37,480
 at the facilities and during the low flow winter periods is when we're performing our

671
00:57:37,480 --> 00:57:44,760
 major maintenance activities. Fortunately, we were not in an outage of any type on either

672
00:57:44,760 --> 00:57:52,880
 of the plants during this time, but we were not prepared to be able to produce 30 million

673
00:57:52,880 --> 00:58:00,480
 gallons per day in the middle of the winter. We just don't set up our operations that way.

674
00:58:00,480 --> 00:58:06,520
 Now that we've seen this incident, we'll be taking measures to make sure that we have

675
00:58:06,520 --> 00:58:12,120
 the ability to do that. Councilmember Meltzer?

676
00:58:12,120 --> 00:58:23,840
 Thank you. With 2020 hindsight, now we would say there's simply no way that people are

677
00:58:23,840 --> 00:58:32,080
 going to conserve water when they need to drip in order to avoid $52500 worth of damage.

678
00:58:32,080 --> 00:58:36,280
 If we started with that point of view, if this were to magically happen exactly the

679
00:58:36,280 --> 00:58:44,240
 same way, would we have given different communication? Like could we have prepared people for the

680
00:58:44,240 --> 00:58:53,680
 clear trending toward boil water notice? But if we see it sooner, instead of saying stop

681
00:58:53,680 --> 00:58:58,600
 dripping, which they're not going to do, would we have given different advice? Do X to prepare

682
00:58:58,600 --> 00:59:05,000
 for the boil water notice that is inevitably coming?

683
00:59:05,000 --> 00:59:11,440
 Let me try to answer that, Councilmember Meltzer. I think that first, we'd never experienced

684
00:59:11,440 --> 00:59:22,360
 this level of freezing for as long as it took place. Normally we'd have our tanks full and

685
00:59:22,360 --> 00:59:28,800
 we'd be filling them back up at night. The level of dripping that we would expect for

686
00:59:28,800 --> 00:59:32,840
 an incident like this would have not been an issue. We should have been able to handle

687
00:59:32,840 --> 00:59:38,440
 it. But the fact that our production facilities were impacted at the same time that we had

688
00:59:38,440 --> 00:59:45,920
 this large demand and we couldn't remedy those production issues because of the weather,

689
00:59:45,920 --> 00:59:55,380
 that was really the problem. As I mentioned, it was unfortunate that we had to issue directives

690
00:59:55,380 --> 01:00:01,600
 or recommendations about dripping water to protect your pipes and then come out and say,

691
01:00:01,600 --> 01:00:09,880
 well, we really need you to conserve now. That conservation message was really focused

692
01:00:09,880 --> 01:00:15,880
 on the public safety aspect of making sure we had enough water if forgotten.

693
01:00:15,880 --> 01:00:20,400
 I'm not saying it critically. I understand entirely what the thought process was, but

694
01:00:20,400 --> 01:00:30,600
 now we have the benefit of 20/40 hindsight. That's why I'm saying knowing what we now

695
01:00:30,600 --> 01:00:36,020
 know about behavior and whatever. Obviously, ideally we're going to plan ahead and the

696
01:00:36,020 --> 01:00:44,880
 situation won't recur, but it could. Maybe don't answer now.

697
01:00:44,880 --> 01:00:51,200
 I really appreciate your point and I wholeheartedly agree with you that if we could figure out

698
01:00:51,200 --> 01:00:55,680
 something that we could have done, and I guess the answer to that would be have our production

699
01:00:55,680 --> 01:01:02,840
 facilities in better shape from a weatherization perspective so that we don't end up in a situation

700
01:01:02,840 --> 01:01:04,400
 where we can't meet the demand.

701
01:01:04,400 --> 01:01:12,960
 I totally get that, but okay. I'm not going to press for an answer, but maybe there is

702
01:01:12,960 --> 01:01:20,760
 something that people could be advised to do in the time before if some other set of

703
01:01:20,760 --> 01:01:29,060
 circumstances converge so that we do face some kind of situation like this. Despite

704
01:01:29,060 --> 01:01:34,520
 our best efforts, is there something we could say in the hours before a boiled water notice

705
01:01:34,520 --> 01:01:36,800
 that would help people prepare?

706
01:01:36,800 --> 01:01:43,080
 I really appreciate the suggestion and we'll certainly look at it to see if there is something

707
01:01:43,080 --> 01:01:56,400
 we can do. With respect to boiled water advisories, we could have potentially notified citizens

708
01:01:56,400 --> 01:02:03,640
 that levels in tanks were getting progressively lower and that delivery pressures were getting

709
01:02:03,640 --> 01:02:08,700
 lower and that there was a potential for boiled water advisory, but I think that would have

710
01:02:08,700 --> 01:02:14,600
 the same effect as the social media posting I mentioned, which was, "Hey, let's fill our

711
01:02:14,600 --> 01:02:15,820
 bathtubs now."

712
01:02:15,820 --> 01:02:17,840
 Well, it's not irrational, right?

713
01:02:17,840 --> 01:02:24,780
 No, it's not. It's a perfectly rational thought process and I don't fault anyone for posting

714
01:02:24,780 --> 01:02:27,480
 that or for taking those actions.

715
01:02:27,480 --> 01:02:30,240
 It just precipitates the thing you know is coming.

716
01:02:30,240 --> 01:02:37,000
 It's kind of like a snowball going downhill, right? The problem gets more and more compounded.

717
01:02:37,000 --> 01:02:45,160
 But maybe there's advice like, just to take a little honing, but we know you're going

718
01:02:45,160 --> 01:02:53,400
 to want to set some water aside, limit it to a gallon or I don't know.

719
01:02:53,400 --> 01:02:56,760
 I think that's a great idea. Yeah, I think that's a great idea.

720
01:02:56,760 --> 01:03:02,060
 Council Member Meltzer, I think from this whole incident that occurred and it pretty

721
01:03:02,060 --> 01:03:08,480
 much showed us where we have some efforts to focus on. That is one, being more proactive

722
01:03:08,480 --> 01:03:14,560
 in preparing our information for sharing with the public. So as you've heard several of

723
01:03:14,560 --> 01:03:18,480
 them say, they were going to go back and look at their emergency operations plans and the

724
01:03:18,480 --> 01:03:24,440
 media part of it and start to develop sort of fact sheets and things that we can then

725
01:03:24,440 --> 01:03:26,880
 have on hand to pull out.

726
01:03:26,880 --> 01:03:32,200
 We also need to help educate our population about, you know, exactly what happened here

727
01:03:32,200 --> 01:03:37,440
 you heard today is what happens when you have a freeze to this extent and the lines that

728
01:03:37,440 --> 01:03:43,680
 we have to maintain are frozen, can't get our generators going and then our water levels

729
01:03:43,680 --> 01:03:48,640
 go down. It really is then a matter of us sharing with the public that while in some

730
01:03:48,640 --> 01:03:54,360
 cases we'd ask you to drip, this is a matter of having water available from an emergency

731
01:03:54,360 --> 01:04:00,200
 circumstance to not drip. And I think it's just a matter of how we start to help share

732
01:04:00,200 --> 01:04:05,080
 these messages so that we're prepared better if and when this happens to us again.

733
01:04:05,080 --> 01:04:09,160
 Well, I, you know, I'm going to go over it over and over and I'm not, I'm not saying

734
01:04:09,160 --> 01:04:16,040
 this out of criticism. I mean, I know that you guys were doing, you know, amazingly difficult

735
01:04:16,040 --> 01:04:22,440
 simultaneous, you know, emergency response situations. So it's not my tenor. It's just,

736
01:04:22,440 --> 01:04:28,760
 you know, okay, what would, you know, just what can we learn? But I don't think what

737
01:04:28,760 --> 01:04:32,800
 we learned is if you explain it better to people, they would stop dripping. I mean,

738
01:04:32,800 --> 01:04:35,560
 my starting point is they're never going to do that.

739
01:04:35,560 --> 01:04:37,200
 No, no, they won't. You're absolutely right.

740
01:04:37,200 --> 01:04:38,200
 Increasing temperatures.

741
01:04:38,200 --> 01:04:42,400
 Yeah. I think it's just, we want to, I think most importantly, we want to help explain

742
01:04:42,400 --> 01:04:47,840
 to the public sort of what has happened, which we're doing and, and what we would do differently

743
01:04:47,840 --> 01:04:52,400
 in the future. You know, this, hopefully we won't experience this, but it looks like it

744
01:04:52,400 --> 01:04:56,920
 happens about every eight to 10 years and we may be up for it again.

745
01:04:56,920 --> 01:04:58,480
 Yep. Thank you.

746
01:04:58,480 --> 01:05:02,560
 Thank you all for that exchange. And I think those are fair questions and fair answers.

747
01:05:02,560 --> 01:05:06,120
 I don't think anybody really expected quite the sequence of events. We've all lived through

748
01:05:06,120 --> 01:05:10,600
 hard freezes, right? We know kind of what to do, but the, the sequence of events this

749
01:05:10,600 --> 01:05:15,240
 time around was a little different. Mr. Sof.

750
01:05:15,240 --> 01:05:24,600
 Yes. Thank you. Um, when this happened, um, state regulators seemingly almost tried to

751
01:05:24,600 --> 01:05:33,800
 downplay the freeze and its impacts by saying it was unprecedented. Uh, it wasn't unprecedented

752
01:05:33,800 --> 01:05:40,360
 as city manager just pointed out, these things happen and are happening, happening more frequently

753
01:05:40,360 --> 01:05:45,840
 just as spring is getting here earlier. All sorts of strange things are happening with

754
01:05:45,840 --> 01:05:52,280
 the climate. And I think anything that we can do to prepare for the worst and hope for

755
01:05:52,280 --> 01:06:02,120
 the best is what we should do. And, um, that's just as a general comment. I mean, uh, rather

756
01:06:02,120 --> 01:06:07,800
 than, I feel that rather than looking for reasons not to do things, we should look for

757
01:06:07,800 --> 01:06:18,080
 reasons in some cases to definitely do things based upon scientific data. Thank you.

758
01:06:18,080 --> 01:06:24,460
 Thank you, Mr. Sof. Other questions for staff? Um, I've got just one kind of along the lines

759
01:06:24,460 --> 01:06:31,000
 of what Ed was just talking about. Um, financially, it may not be the most feasible thing, but

760
01:06:31,000 --> 01:06:38,200
 from a regulatory standpoint, are we, um, we have a good neighbor with co-serve, uh,

761
01:06:38,200 --> 01:06:44,640
 they, they service our Ray Roberts plant usually without incident. Um, but you know, if that

762
01:06:44,640 --> 01:06:48,640
 had been an in-house thing, if DME had service that plant, then maybe we would have known

763
01:06:48,640 --> 01:06:56,280
 which, which feeder, which circuit our own water plant was on. Um, is it, uh, is it feasible

764
01:06:56,280 --> 01:07:02,680
 not necessarily for financial standpoint, but from a, uh, a technological and a technical

765
01:07:02,680 --> 01:07:09,080
 and regulatory standpoint, is it feasible and possible to, uh, power the Ray Roberts

766
01:07:09,080 --> 01:07:14,880
 water plant from DME or some measure of backup besides just the generators?

767
01:07:14,880 --> 01:07:21,760
 Uh, yes, sir. It is, uh, we could run a line up there. It is a dual-serve area and we could

768
01:07:21,760 --> 01:07:29,120
 run a line up there. It's just cost prohibitive. And, uh, I know as we talk about reliability

769
01:07:29,120 --> 01:07:36,080
 of our water system, it seems a little ironic to talk about cost, um, where the difference

770
01:07:36,080 --> 01:07:42,480
 might've been, uh, uh, that we were able to run the plant a little bit better, but, um,

771
01:07:42,480 --> 01:07:46,920
 it's very expensive. I can't remember the exact mileage to run it up there, but it's

772
01:07:46,920 --> 01:07:56,800
 several million dollars, uh, to run a service up there. And again, our, our, our, uh, co-serve

773
01:07:56,800 --> 01:08:01,840
 itself has been very cooperative since the storm. And in fact, during the middle of the

774
01:08:01,840 --> 01:08:08,400
 storm, uh, rotated, took us off the rotation and put us on a critical service. So we feel

775
01:08:08,400 --> 01:08:14,800
 pretty good that the, uh, the service that we're getting for that facility, uh, is improving.

776
01:08:14,800 --> 01:08:19,880
 And as I mentioned, we will upgrade, uh, as part of the regulatory upgrade program, we'll

777
01:08:19,880 --> 01:08:28,200
 be looking at integrating, uh, relays and sensor, sensing equipment into our, into our

778
01:08:28,200 --> 01:08:33,480
 generators so that they will automatically come online and we shouldn't see the kind

779
01:08:33,480 --> 01:08:40,000
 of interruption that, that, uh, Preetam mentioned requires us to go out and re-recheck all the

780
01:08:40,000 --> 01:08:45,520
 equipment. We can put some technology in place that will enable that, that generator to start

781
01:08:45,520 --> 01:08:50,820
 up automatically due to power quality issues. Um, that will, that will go a long way to

782
01:08:50,820 --> 01:08:53,740
 improving the reliability of the facility.

783
01:08:53,740 --> 01:08:59,580
 Much cheaper to soup up the generators than to run in millions of dollars worth of power

784
01:08:59,580 --> 01:09:03,980
 lines. And I imagine that's probably, that's a dual service area. I'm sure that's an analysis

785
01:09:03,980 --> 01:09:08,880
 we did when we built that plant as well, why we have co-serve power out there. Uh, Mr.

786
01:09:08,880 --> 01:09:10,160
 Sheik.

787
01:09:10,160 --> 01:09:15,280
 Just one quick thing, and I'll continue to praise staff on the job that they did and

788
01:09:15,280 --> 01:09:21,400
 getting people out and getting out there, um, keeping us, keeping us alive. I really appreciate

789
01:09:21,400 --> 01:09:28,040
 it. Um, one recommendation we, there was a plan about 15, 20 years ago at the CFDN where

790
01:09:28,040 --> 01:09:35,160
 they outreached the various departments to business community for emergency help. Um,

791
01:09:35,160 --> 01:09:40,320
 I suggest that you look into that as well. I think there's some help to be had there.

792
01:09:40,320 --> 01:09:46,320
 Um, I think a lot of businesses, what I'm involved with, when it's freezes outside,

793
01:09:46,320 --> 01:09:51,960
 we don't do a lot. So all we can do is help with the equipment that we have. And I think

794
01:09:51,960 --> 01:09:57,640
 there's a lot of other businesses out there that can contribute. That was it.

795
01:09:57,640 --> 01:10:06,400
 That's a great point, Bill. Thank you. Other questions for staff? Go ahead, Councilmember

796
01:10:06,400 --> 01:10:07,400
 Johnson.

797
01:10:07,400 --> 01:10:14,160
 We were able to get those water mains repaired and up and running within, uh, a day or that

798
01:10:14,160 --> 01:10:21,440
 day or so. I recognize the fact that we have water mains that break summer and winter.

799
01:10:21,440 --> 01:10:25,640
 So I guess that there is really going to not be a real solution to whether or not they

800
01:10:25,640 --> 01:10:31,640
 break or not. But I think that the most important really is that we get them up and running

801
01:10:31,640 --> 01:10:36,760
 as quickly as possible so that people don't have to go without water and as well as the

802
01:10:36,760 --> 01:10:43,200
 streets that are going to be torn up because of that. So were we able to work within that

803
01:10:43,200 --> 01:10:49,960
 week or in that few days of getting those that were broken during that time up and running?

804
01:10:49,960 --> 01:10:54,760
 Correct. We, we were able to get a majority of them up and running. There were a couple

805
01:10:54,760 --> 01:11:03,040
 that were isolated that had some additional issues. But as a result of that isolation,

806
01:11:03,040 --> 01:11:08,800
 the service was not impacted to the residents. We were able to circulate or bypass those

807
01:11:08,800 --> 01:11:16,600
 areas and then come back and do the repairs. But yes, majority of them were repaired within

808
01:11:16,600 --> 01:11:21,240
 acceptable time limits. This is where we had some extra help from our wastewater folks

809
01:11:21,240 --> 01:11:29,840
 coming in and helping us to address them quickly.

810
01:11:29,840 --> 01:11:36,840
 Any other questions on this agenda item? Very good. Seeing none, I want to echo Mr. Cheek

811
01:11:36,840 --> 01:11:42,720
 and thanks staff for their excellent response during this event. A million things happening

812
01:11:42,720 --> 01:11:50,440
 at once. Each next step was uncertain. And, and board member DaVinci's got found the applause

813
01:11:50,440 --> 01:11:56,760
 button there on zoom. So just a quick program note, as we close out, we do have the council

814
01:11:56,760 --> 01:12:02,040
 luncheon coming up. We're going to start that at 1220 for council members. It's a different

815
01:12:02,040 --> 01:12:06,200
 zoom link. It's a different web link for those following along at home. And we'll start that

816
01:12:06,200 --> 01:12:12,360
 at 1220. So at this time, I will conclude the Denton city council meeting and Mr. Cheek

817
01:12:12,360 --> 01:12:18,120
 and we'll stand adjourned with the BUB. Thanks, y'all. Thank you.